From Privacy to Publicity: The Tort of Appropriation in the Age of Mass Consumption by Barbas, Samantha
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2013 
From Privacy to Publicity: The Tort of Appropriation in the Age of 
Mass Consumption 
Samantha Barbas 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Privacy Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Samantha Barbas, From Privacy to Publicity: The Tort of Appropriation in the Age of Mass Consumption, 
61 Buff. L. Rev. 1119 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/15 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 























   
 
  
From Privacy to Publicity: The Tort of 




In 1900, a modest young woman named Abigail 
Roberson unexpectedly found her picture on an ad for
Franklin Mills flour.1 The advertisement was plastered on
billboards, walls, and storefronts throughout the country.2 
When Roberson found out about the unauthorized use of her 
image in the ad, she was outraged.3 She was distressed that
her picture had been associated with a cheap commercial 
product and “mortified” that her face had been turned into
an object and spectacle—“a method of attracting widespread 
public attention to . . . wares.”4 The public’s sympathies 
were on her side: circulating a woman’s picture “as an
advertisement for . . . merchandise” was seen as immoral
and scandalous.5 Roberson sued the advertiser for emotional
and dignitary injuries—for an invasion of her right to
privacy.6 
Almost three decades later, in 1929, another young 
woman brought suit in New York state court over the
unauthorized commercial use of her image.7 Gladys Loftus’ 
picture had been used without her consent in an
advertisement for a film that was posted conspicuously 
† Associate Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School. J.D. Stanford Law
School; Ph.D., History, University of California, Berkeley.
1. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
2. See id.
 3. Id.
 4. Id. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting). 
5. The Abolition of Breach of Promise Suits, 10 AM. LAW. 339 (1902).
 6. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 544.  
7. Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., 182 N.Y.S. 428 (App. Div. 1920).
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1120 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61
around New York City.8 Unlike Roberson, Loftus did not
seek recovery for emotional, reputational, or dignitary
injuries.9 Words like “humiliation” and “mortification”
appear nowhere in her claim or in the court’s opinion. What 
she sought, instead, was purely pecuniary—she wanted to 
be paid for the use of her picture.10 
At the turn of the twentieth century, cases like 
Roberson were not uncommon. Advertisers for various 
consumer goods regularly used images of random
individuals in advertisements without their consent, 
causing great embarrassment and distress. “[T]he ordinary
citizen, man or woman,” one critic lamented, “has absolutely
no redress against the machinations of the advertising
agent who . . . may choose to utilize the picture of any
reputable and retiring member of the community as a
method of advertising . . . .”11 This “misuse” of the human
face was described as “revolting to common sense and
common decency.”12 In response to this seeming plague of 
commercial exploitation, states began to recognize a tort of
invasion of privacy—more specifically, a tort of commercial 
appropriation of identity, one of the four “branch[es]” of the 
tort of invasion of privacy.13 Under the privacy or 
“appropriation” tort as it then existed, a person whose
image had been used in an advertisement without 
authorization could sue and recover damages for dignitary
and emotional harms.14 
With the growth of a mass consumer culture and the
advertising industry in the twentieth century, acts of 




 11. The Miscalled Right of Privacy, 10 AM. LAW. 293 (1902).
 12. The Right to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1904, at 6.  
13. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 401-06 (1960).
 14. See generally Jonathan D. Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: 
Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17































     





2013] FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 1121
increased significantly. By the 1950s, however, the typical 
appropriation claim looked much different than it had in the
tort’s early years. Cases were more often like Loftus than 
Roberson. Plaintiffs sought to recover lost profits from the
unauthorized use of their images, rather than compensation 
for shame, humiliation, or emotional distress. Several states 
formally reworked the tort so that it no longer principally
compensated dignitary and emotional injuries, but rather
economic harms—it protected the “pecuniary interest in the 
commercial exploitation of [] identity.”15 In some states, the 
appropriation tort was redesignated as a quasi-property
interest, a “right of publicity.”16 
15. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.
1983). 
16. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953); Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, 
and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 666-67 (1991). Post wrote:  
Growing out of the appropriation tort, or . . . substituting for the
appropriation tort, the right of publicity was designed as a property
right that would safeguard the goodwill created by celebrities in their
public persona. . . . [T]he “key feature distinguishing the Right of
Publicity” from the personal right to privacy is the “measure of
damage,” which “focuses upon the commercial injury to the plaintiff”
instead of upon indignity and mental distress. 
Id. In some states, the tort of appropriation still compensates mental distress
caused by the unauthorized commercial exploitation of a person’s identity—
albeit in a narrow and cramped manner, as will be discussed—while the “right
of publicity” protects the pecuniary interest in one’s identity. See Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1995); see 
also Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725, 730 (8th Cir. 1995) (While
privacy rights protect against “mental distress that accompanies undesired
publicity” the right of publicity protects “pecuniary, not emotional, interests.”);
Post, supra at 672 (noting the minority view that still constructs the tort 
normatively as an “affront to dignity”).  
As J. Thomas McCarthy has observed, “An infringement of the right of publicity
focuses upon injury to the pocketbook, while an invasion of ‘appropriation
privacy’ focuses upon injury to the psyche.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS
OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.8(C) (1987). McCarthy wrote:
The distinction between these two torts is the interest each seeks to
protect. The appropriation tort seeks to protect an individual’s personal
interest in privacy; the personal injury is measured in terms of the
mental anguish that results from the appropriation of an ordinary 
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This shift from an exclusively dignitary tort to one 
oriented around profit and “publicity”—from “protecting the
integrity of an individual’s identity to protecting [its]
economic value”17—has for decades been the subject of legal 
writing and commentary. In 1960, William Prosser, in his 
well-known law review article Privacy, was one of the first
to observe that the appropriation tort had moved far from
its original concern with protecting dignity and “privacy.”18 
“The interest protected,” he wrote, “is not so much a mental 
as a proprietary one, in the exclusive use of the plaintiff’s 
name and [image] as an aspect of his identity.”19 Several 
scholars since Prosser have similarly noted that the “early
association of appropriation claims with such intangible . . . 
attributes of the self as dignity and the integrity of one’s
persona” were lost . . . “as property-based conceptions of the
legal status of identity have come to the fore.”20 No one
seems to dispute that this shift occurred.21 Why it happened,
individual’s identity. The right of publicity seeks to protect the property
interest that a celebrity has in his or her name . . . . 
Id. (quoting Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d at 1283); see also Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, 
and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C.L. REV. 1345, 1345-46 (2009) (“Publicity
actions typically are regarded as the means to achieve compensation for the
loss of financial gain due to a defendant’s unauthorized appropriation. In
contrast, the right of privacy continues to be regarded as the predicate for 
actions based on hurt feelings.”). 
17. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can 
Learn From Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1167 (2006).
 18. See Prosser, supra note 13, at 406; see also Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back 
to Light, supra note 14, at 226 (“Prosser set the stage for the eclipse of privacy-
based concerns for dignity by an interest in the material value of celebrity
identity.”).
 19. Prosser, supra note 13, at 406. 
20. Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, supra note 14, at 223.  
21. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 17, at 1167, 1172 (separating the “privacy”
phase of appropriation from the “right of publicity” phase); Sheldon W. Halpern,
The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the
Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 853 (1995) [hereinafter
Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation] (“After forty years of wandering in
a definitional wilderness, the right of publicity appears to have reached the
promised land of independent status, a distinct right and remedy unmoored
from privacy . . .”); Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, supra note 14, at 213-












   
    


















   
    
 
2013] FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 1123
however, has yet to be sufficiently explained. Why was the
tort action for commercial appropriation of identity, initially 
rooted in dignitary and privacy interests, eventually
eclipsed by a profit-oriented “right of publicity”?22 
The reigning account in the legal scholarship is the
“celebrity thesis.” Scholars have argued that the emphasis
on profit over privacy was a response to the development of
an American celebrity culture in the first half of the
twentieth century.23 By the 1950s, celebrity, particularly
film celebrity, had become a source of immense economic 
value. But celebrities lacked legal means to protect that
value. Courts did not permit stars whose images had been 
commercially exploited without their consent to recover 
under the appropriation tort as it then existed, as a
dignitary tort. The rationale was that a person who made a
business out of publicizing herself could not legitimately 
claim that her dignity or “privacy” had been injured by
unwanted publicity. The obvious inadequacy of the existing 
tort in protecting the economic “needs of Broadway and
as its flashier cousin, publicity, has risen to prominence.”); Mark P. McKenna, 
The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225,
228 (2005); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203 (1954). 
22. See Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, supra note 14, at 214 (noting 
that the right of publicity “eclipsed” the tort of invasion of privacy by
commercial appropriation); see also William Parent, A New Definition of Privacy
for the Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 305 (1993).
 23. McKenna, supra note 21, at 228. McKenna writes:
Celebrities . . . actively seek and profit from attention . . . . [C]ourts and
commentators therefore assumed that they suffer no hurt feelings from
receiving publicity . . . . Thus, privacy claims were unavailable to
celebrities, and they needed some other claim to prevent commercial
uses of their identities. The right of publicity was created specifically to
meet that need.
Id.; see also Mark Bartholomew, A Right is Born: Celebrity, Property, and
Postmodern Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 301, 310-11 (2011) [hereinafter
Bartholomew, A Right is Born]; Joseph R. Grodin, The Right of Publicity: A
Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123, 1127-29 (1953); Sheldon W. Halpern,
The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of
Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1205-07 (1986) [hereinafter Halpern, The 
Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation]. See generally Peter L. Felcher &
Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People in the 
Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979). 
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Hollywood”24 led courts to develop a “right of publicity” that
eventually supplanted or overshadowed the earlier dignity 
or privacy-based action.25 
This celebrity thesis is not wrong, though it is
incomplete. It is true that the advent of a celebrity culture
did create significant “publicity value” in star images. It is
also true that the privacy or dignity-based tort did not
protect famous people’s economic interests in their public 
personae. But the rise of celebrity culture alone cannot
explain why dignity seemed to fall out of the appropriation 
equation. It does not explain why the unauthorized 
commercial use of the persona, once regarded primarily as
an injury to one’s dignity and reputation, came to be viewed
as principally, if not exclusively, an economic injury. This 
article argues that there is something critical missing from
the current explanation, and that the missing element is an
understanding of the social meanings surrounding the 
commercial use of the human persona. That a phenomenon
once considered to be morally reprehensible, even
scandalous, came to be seen by many as more traumatic to
the pocketbook than to the personality suggests a cultural
shift of the first order—a fundamental change in social 
attitudes towards advertising, consumer culture, and the 
commercialization of human identity. 
This Article offers an alternative account of the tort’s
transformation, one that explains the change as a function
of evolving social norms. The basic argument is that the law
24. Nimmer, supra note 21, at 203. 
25. MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 5.8(B). According to McCarthy: 
“[P]rivacy” law, locked into the traditional rubric of “a right of human
dignity to be left alone and private,” seemed unable to accommodate the
claims of celebrity plaintiffs. It was thought that those who were
“celebrities” could suffer no indignity or hurt feelings merely because of
exposure in advertising use. While the non-celebrity plaintiff could at 
least make a show of hurt feelings, the celebrity was thought to be able
to make a claim only for the loss of payment of the reasonable value of 
his or her identity. The traditional law of privacy permitted no such
claim. Thus was born the concept of the Right of Publicity. . . . Like Eve 

























     
   
   
  
   
2013] FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 1125
of appropriation shifted its register in response to changing 
public views on the morality of advertising and mass
consumption. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
when prevailing middle-class values were frugality,
modesty, and self-restraint, advertising and the consumer 
marketplace were associated with forbidden temptation and
regarded as corrupt and morally illicit.26 It was
embarrassing and undignified to be publicly associated with 
consumer products. Using a person’s image in an
advertisement—commodifying her identity and associating
her with the immoral “taint of commerce”—represented an
affront to that person’s dignity and reputation. The tort of 
appropriation was created to redress these intangible 
harms. 
By the 1940s, the cultural meaning of mass
consumption had entirely transformed.27 The United States
had become a celebrity culture and a consumer culture,
obsessed with conspicuous consumption. Being publicly 
associated with products, and being seen by the public as an
endorser of products, were no longer regarded as 
humiliating and disreputable acts, but rather, in many
cases, as glamorous and prestigious. In this milieu, courts 
began to question whether the use of a person’s image in an
ad, even if unconsented, was really an insult to one’s dignity
and reputation. The right of publicity eclipsed the right of
privacy when modern consumer culture came to see loss of
profit as the more serious and probable consequence of the
unauthorized commercial exploitation of a person’s image,
rather than harm to one’s dignity or emotions.  
The first two parts of this article narrate the origins of
appropriation as a dignity-based tort in the last two decades 
of the nineteenth century. The appropriation tort originated 
from a little-known episode that was described at the time
26. See e.g., T.J. JACKSON LEARS, NO PLACE OF GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 1880-1920, at 5 (University of 
Chicago Press 1994) (1981) [hereinafter LEARS, NO PLACE OF GRACE]; Simon J.
Bronner, Reading Consumer Culture, in  CONSUMING VISIONS: ACCUMULATION
AND DISPLAY OF GOODS IN AMERICA 1800-1920, at 13 (Simon J. Bronner ed.,
1989). 
27. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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as a crisis of “circulating portraits.” As Part I explains, this
crisis arose from the convergence of two new social forces in 
the late 1800s: photography and mass advertising.
Advertisers of various consumer products sought to use
photographic portraits of people to enliven their
advertisements, but such portraits were not easy to obtain.
Photographic technologies were crude, and at a time when 
advertising and the world of consumer goods were regarded 
as morally unsavory, it was challenging to find people who
would pose for ads. In desperation, advertisers stole
portraits of individuals from photography studios and used 
them in ads without the consent of the subjects. As men and 
women of all backgrounds unexpectedly found their pictures
in ads for patent medicines, complexion beautifiers,28 and 5 
cent cigars, they expressed feelings of shame, indignity, and
outrage. Few things were more insulting and degrading, it
was said, “than the wanton and brutal publication for 
advertising purposes of the portrait of one who has not
consented.”29 
Beginning in the 1890s, these victims of the “circulating
portrait” problem began to seek legal redress for injuries to
their feelings, reputations, and dignity, as Part II explains.
Many of them brought cases for libel, claiming that the
advertisers’ false depiction of them as endorsers of
consumer products was injurious to their reputations. By 
1900, they had also begun to sue under the newly invented 
tort of invasion of privacy. The privacy tort, famously 
proposed by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 and adopted by 
several states in the early twentieth century, was designed 
to redress the dignitary injuries—harms to one’s honor,
sensibilities, and sense of self—caused by the unauthorized 
use of one’s portrait in an advertisement.30 
Parts III and IV discuss the demise of the nineteenth
century anti-commodification ethos, the rise of a modern 
consumerist worldview, and the subsequent transformation
 28. See, e.g., CHI. TRIB., July 29, 1907.
29. Burdett A. Rich, What Invasions of Privacy are Unlawful?, 18 L.
STUDENT’S HELPER 238 (1910). 
30. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.

























2013] FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 1127
of the appropriation action. By the 1920s, earlier moral 
restrictions on consumerism and material acquisition had
begun to weaken. A new spirit of materialism, sensual
indulgence, and self-display was beginning to take root. 
Movie stars and other entertainment performers, who were 
being paid large sums to lend their images to advertisers,
came to be regarded as the epitome of social status and
achievement. As the commercialization of identity took on
an aura of prestige, the argument that the unauthorized
advertising use of one’s image subjected one to extreme
indignity, opprobrium, and scorn became difficult to 
maintain. Indeed, many individuals whose identities were
used in ads and other commercial venues were no longer
asking for recovery for dignitary injuries, but were seeking
to recover what the defendant would have paid them for the
commercial use of their pictures. In what would surely be
an affront to earlier, nineteenth century sensibilities, they
sought to make money from their own images. A testament
to this new cultural orientation, the law no longer targeted
representations that were humiliating and undignified but 
rather representations that were uncompensated. 
This article explains appropriation’s transformation 
through the lens of cultural history. It also seeks to
understand trends in American culture from the vantage of
tort law. The doctrinal shift that this article describes can
be seen as part of a broader cultural, moral, and psychic 
transformation that ensued as the United States became a 
consumer culture in the first half of the twentieth century,
particularly the first two decades of the century. Historians
have written extensively on the “revolution in manners and 
morals” that occurred in this time, and how Americans used 
a variety of cultural texts—from literature to art to fashion
shows—to evaluate the rapid changes occurring around
them and reenvision “new relationships between goods and 
people.”31 Another venue where this reorientation was 
taking place, I want to suggest, was legal cases brought over 
advertising appropriation of personal images. Appropriation
cases and the public discourse that surrounded them 
became forums where the social and personal implications
31. Bronner, supra note 26, at 31-32.
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of advertising and mass consumerism were discussed and 
debated. Through appropriation litigation, the law was
being used to rethink connections between people, morals, 
markets, and goods. 
I. THE CRISIS OF THE “CIRCULATING PORTRAIT,” 1880-1905  
The tort of commercial appropriation of identity as a 
dignity or privacy-based tort originated from the cultural 
and moral upheaval that took place in the United States in
the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It was a
response to perceived assaults to the self and the social 
fabric posed by new modes of production, new forms of 
technology and communication, and new sources of desire:
namely, a new mass market for consumer goods, a
commercial advertising industry, and novel photographic
technologies. Advertisers’ desperation for photographs to
use in their advertisements, and their subsequent theft and 
misappropriation of portraits, led to a social and moral 
crisis that generated a multifaceted legal response. This
problem was described at the time as a crisis of “circulating 
portraits.” 
A.  The Origins of Mass Advertising  
In the last quarter of the 1800s, American capitalism
shifted from its agrarian base to a new regime of industrial 
manufacturing. Innovations in technology—in particular,
the development of new continuous-process machinery—led
to the mass production of low-priced, packaged consumer 
items.32 Standardized, inexpensive food products, clothing,
and toiletries flooded the market.33 Manufacturers built
large marketing and purchasing networks, and a spectrum
of retail businesses, from dry goods stores to department
stores, arose in both urban and rural areas across the
country.34 By the 1890s, the nation had established the 
32. DANIEL POPE, THE MAKING OF MODERN ADVERTISING 32 (1983).
 33. See id.
 34. Id. (“The era of industrialization from the mid-nineteenth century 
through the 1890s was marked by qualitative change as well as staggering 





















    
    
 
 




2013] FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 1129
social and institutional foundations of what would become, 
in the twentieth century, a flourishing consumer society. 
This rapid growth in productive capacity far outpaced 
the needs of the population.35 The remedy for the surplus of
commodities became the creation of consumer demand.36 In 
order for the economy to function properly, traditional 
inhibitions to spending—a reverence for the virtues of 
frugality and restraint—had to be cleared away.37 As a 
result, entrepreneurs became preoccupied with selling— 
with the distribution and traffic of goods.38 They worked
hard to generate yearnings for products, for items that were 
not necessities, but rather whims, fantasies, and luxuries.
The key agent in the creation and legitimation of 
consumer desire was advertising.39 Print advertising for
products and services was well-established in the United 
States, but its nature and role in American society changed 
substantially in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Before then, the function of advertising had been primarily
one of providing facts about products.40 By the 1880s,
advertising’s principal purpose was to generate desire and
“attempt to influence buyers by any means possible.”41 Early 
35. DAVID M. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE
AMERICAN CHARACTER 172-73 (Paperback ed. 2009).
 36. See id. at 173.
 37. Id. at 172.  
38. William Leach, Strategists of Display and the Production of Desire, in 
CONSUMING VISIONS: ACCUMULATION AND DISPLAY OF GOODS IN AMERICA, 1800-
1920, 99, 101 (Simon J. Bronner ed., 1989).  
39. POTTER, supra note 35, at 172 (“[A]dvertising is not badly needed in an
economy of scarcity . . . . It is when . . . abundance prevails—that advertising 
begins to fulfill a really essential economic function.”).
 40. Id. at 171.
 41. SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN MASS MARKET 91 (1989). See also POTTER, supra note 35, at 171; T.J.
Jackson Lears, From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the
Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, in THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION:
CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1980, at 68 (Richard Wightman
Fox & T.J. Lears eds., 1983) [hereinafter Lears, From Salvation to Self-
Realization] (“Amid a mounting din of product claims, many national
advertisers shifted their focus from presenting information to attracting
attention.”).
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American advertisers had typically been local wholesalers 
or retailers, but by the late 1800s, advertising began to be 
created by the producers of various consumer goods.42 The 
first national advertisers of consumer products were mass
manufacturers of packaged, brand-name household goods,
such as cereals and soaps.43 By 1900, ads for these 
household items, and for mass-produced leisure products—
bicycles, perfumes, furniture, and fashion items—appeared 
in a variety of forms, including pamphlets, brochures,
window displays, and billboards.44 Ads also populated
newspapers and magazines; by the end of the nineteenth 
century, most publications “consider[ed] advertisements as 
a vital source of revenue.”45 
In this era there was no advertising “industry” to speak
of.46 Manufacturers were generally responsible for creating
their own advertisements, and ad “agents” secured places
for them in periodicals and other public places.47 As the
volume of advertising grew, these manufacturer/advertisers
employed increasingly dramatic strategies to distinguish 
their appeals from those of their competitors. In 1893, Joel
Benton, a frequent writer in the advertising trade press, 
commented that because of the growing competition for
42. PAMELA WALKER LAIRD, ADVERTISING PROGRESS: AMERICAN BUSINESS AND
THE RISE OF CONSUMER MARKETING 53-56 (1998).
 43. See id.
44. Advertising images began to fill the visual landscape. See Michael
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 156 (1993); see also  RICHARD OHMANN, SELLING
CULTURE: MAGAZINES, MARKETS, AND CLASS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 175
(1996) (noting “the saturation of commercial space with commercial messages
and images”). 
45. JULIANN SIVULKA, SOAP, SEX, AND CIGARETTES: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN ADVERTISING 19 (2012). The growth of national advertising in the
1890s dovetailed with the growth of magazine circulation, which increasingly
relied on advertising revenues to cut newsstand prices. Id.; see also LAIRD, supra
note 42, at 86.
 46. SIVULKA, supra note 45, at 32.  
47. By the 1900s, agencies would be formed for the purposes of creating 
advertisements as well as securing their placement. MICHAEL SCHUDSON,
ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT ON AMERICAN
























          
 
  
     
    
   
     
    





   
2013] FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 1131
audiences, “the advertiser . . . needs to ‘invoke attention and
fasten remembrance.’”48 As a result of this need, “a change
has been rapidly coming, . . . calculated to make the style
almost more important than the thing said.”49 Each 
individual advertisement became “engaged in an escalating
struggle for the reader’s” eye.50 Images became an important 
part of this “struggle.”51 
In the mid-1800s, chromolithography, an elaborate
method for reproducing hand-drawn images, had been used
to illustrate print advertising. At that time, technology did
not permit photographs to be printed in newspapers and 
magazines.52 By the 1890s, however, the development of the
halftone process enabled the mass reproduction of images in 
the press.53 The halftone screen process allowed printers to
print photographs on pages along with typeset copy.54 By
1900, the halftone process was a principal technique for
publishers of mass illustrated materials and was in common
use in newspaper publishing.55 
With its aura of novelty, glamour, and authenticity,
photography soon replaced chromolithography as the
48. LAIRD, supra note 42, at 264.
 49. Id. at 264-65.
 50. POPE, supra note 32, at 233-34. 
51. LAIRD, supra note 42, at 264; SIVULKA, supra note 45, at 64 (“Growing 
competition for consumer goods created a need for images that stood out on the
pages of magazines and posters.”). 
52. See KEVIN G. BARNHURST & JOHN NERONE, THE FORM OF NEWS: A HISTORY
114-5 (2001) (discussing the difficulties of picture reproducing in the periodicals
of the nineteenth century). 
53. NEIL HARRIS, CULTURAL EXCURSIONS: MARKETING APPETITES AND
CULTURAL TASTES IN MODERN AMERICA 306 (1990); ROBERT HIRSCH, SEIZING THE
LIGHT: A HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY 316 (2000).
 54. ELSPETH H. BROWN, THE CORPORATE EYE: PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN COMMERCIAL CULTURE, 1884-1929, at 162 (2005).
55. Id. at 163; JOHN TAGG, THE BURDEN OF REPRESENTATION: ESSAYS ON
PHOTOGRAPHIES AND HISTORIES 56 (1988). The invention of the halftone
triggered what has been described as a visual “revolution” in American culture.
HARRIS, supra note 53, at 306. The generation of Americans living between 1885
and 1910, in the words of historian Neil Harris, went through an “experience of
visual reorientation that had few earlier precedents.” Id.
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technology of choice for advertising illustration.56 During the
1890-1910 period, photography suffused the advertising 
space in popular magazines. In 1892, according to one
observer, “photography is seen to have expanded over more
than one-half of the advertising space.”57 Advertisers
especially favored photographic portraits—images of the 
human face—as a means of attracting attention to goods by
imbuing products with what was known in the trade as 
“human interest.”58 They particularly coveted photos of
females because of women’s association with respectability 
—women’s photos would “succeed in appealing to the ‘better’ 
sorts of audiences of both genders,” noted one
commentator.59 Several commercial companies, particularly 
liquor and patent medicines, decided that their ads “ought
to be ‘brightened by pretty faces,’ and they began to use
photographs of beautiful women for this purpose.”60 “Pretty
girls,” it was said, “could . . . sell absolutely everything.”61 
By 1900, photographic portraits appeared in ads for a
vast array of consumer products.62 As one writer noted in
1902, “most magazine advertisements draw attention to . . . 
the article . . . whenever possible by a photograph.”63 “If a 
pretty girl holds up the candy or the soap, or a cherubic 
56. LAIRD, supra note 42, at 260-61; MILES ORVELL, AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHY
184 (2003) [hereinafter ORVELL, AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHY]. 
57. BROWN, supra note 54, at 163 (quoting Walter Scot, a “contemporary 
observer”).
 58. Elspeth H. Brown, From Artists’ Model to the ‘Natural Girl’: Containing
Sexuality in Early-Twentieth-Century Modeling, in FASHIONING MODELS: IMAGE,
TEXT AND INDUSTRY 50 (Joanne Entwistle and Elizabeth Wissinger eds., 2012)
[hereainfter Brown, From Artists’ Model to the ‘Natural Girl’]. 
59. LAIRD, supra note 42, at 266.
 60. LOIS W. BANNER, AMERICAN BEAUTY 262 (1983) [hereinafter BANNER,
AMERICAN BEAUTY]. 
61. HEINZ K. HENISCH & BRIDGET A. HENISCH, THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EXPERIENCE
1839-1914: IMAGES AND ATTITUDES 232 (1994). A series of “pretty girl” 
advertising images were in use at the turn of the century by such manufacturers
as Coca-Cola and Kodak. SIVULKA, supra note 45, at 57-58.  
62. John Brisben Walker, Beauty in Advertising Illustrations, COSMOPOLITAN, 
Sept. 1902, at 33.  
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youngster eats the health food, so much the better.”64 It did 
not matter that these pictures were largely irrelevant to the 
advertised item, explained the advertising trade journal
Printers’ Ink. 65 The philosophy in the publishing field was 
“better any picture than no picture.”66 
B.  The Photographic Image  
Although the use of photographs in ads was novel in the 
late nineteenth century, photography was by no means a 
new medium. In the United States, portrait photography
dates back to the 1840s and the invention of the 
daguerreotype, the first commercially successful 
photographic technology.67 By the mid-1800s, photography 
studios had sprung up in cities across the country.68 Sitting 
for one’s photograph became a ritual of self-representation
for Americans of all classes.69 
From the start, the photographic medium was
understood to be essentially different from other media of 
representing the self. One outstanding feature was its
apparent verisimilitude: “At the heart of the enthusiasm for 
the new process of photography,” historian Miles Orvell 
writes, “was the simple astonishment and pleasure at
seeing an image of external reality reproduced with such
fidelity.”70 The photographic image was seen as not merely
more accurate than hand drawings but also more authentic.
 64. Id.
 65. LAIRD, supra note 42, at 266.
 66. HENISCH, supra note 61, at 235 (“Often a photograph, apparently chosen
at random and quite irrelevant to the matter in hand, can be found slapped to
the back of an advertisement, as a tiny hook to catch an eye.”). 
67. HENISCH, supra note 61, at 1; MILES ORVELL, THE REAL THING: IMITATION
AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN CULTURE, 1880-1940, at 21 (1989) [hereinafter
ORVELL, THE REAL THING]. 
68. ORVELL, AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 56, at 21. “By 1853, three 
million daguerreotypes were being made annually and there were eighty-six 
portrait galleries in New York City alone . . . .” TAGG, supra note 55, at 43. 
69. The photograph “[let] virtually everyone establish a visible self-image,”
and as such, became an “emblem of [] democracy.” ORVELL, AMERICAN
PHOTOGRAPHY supra note 56, at 21. 
70. Id. at 19.
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It was widely believed that the photographic portrait—
particularly of the face—captured the essence of a person.71 
Photographic portraits were not simply a record of
appearance but a symbol of the inner self, a “window into 
the soul.”72 Professional photographers developed a
rationale which held that the “true photographic artist”
treated surface appearances as expressions of a deep inner 
reality.73 
Portraits were typically commissioned for personal uses, 
and portraits of individuals and families were collected in
albums or hung on the walls of homes.74 Sometimes they 
were given to others.75 In the mid-1800s, cartes-de-visite,
portraits glued to a card with the individual’s name printed
on the back,76 were circulated among friends and 
acquaintances as “calling cards” of personal identity.77 The
ubiquity of photographic portraits and “the near-
universality of the experience of sitting for one’s 
daguerreotype circulated throughout America a new regard 
for visibility, for one’s own image as a medium of self-
presentation,” historian Alan Trachtenberg writes.78 The
men and women who sat for their photographs attended 
carefully to every detail—clothing, poses, backdrop,
expression—to create images that indicated “this is how I 
71. ORVELL, THE REAL THING, supra note 67, at 89; see also MARY WARNER
MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY: A CULTURAL HISTORY 74 (2d ed. 2006). “The idea that
the human face carries indelible signs of the real character and attributes of a 
person is ancient.” PETER HAMILTON & ROGER HARGREAVES, NATIONAL PORTRAIT 
GALLERY (GREAT BRITAIN), THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE DAMNED: THE CREATION OF
IDENTITY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY PHOTOGRAPHY 63 (2001). 
72. LINDA HAVERTY RUGG, PICTURING OURSELVES: PHOTOGRAPHY AND
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 88 (2007).
 73. ALAN TRACHTENBERG, READING AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHS: IMAGES AS
HISTORY: MATHEW BRADY TO WALKER EVANS 27 (1990). 
74. ORVELL, THE REAL THING, supra note 67, at 73.  
75. Id.
 76. See generally  ROBIN & CAROL WICHARD, VICTORIAN CARTE-DE-VISITE
(1999).
 77. TAGG, supra note 55, at 50. 
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look, this is what I do, this is who I am.”79 With great
interest and care, people memorialized themselves with
their photographs, circulated those images to desired
audiences, and displayed them in contexts they wished to be
seen.80 
C.  The Appropriated Image 
Despite their efforts to control their photographic
images and the circulation of those images, late nineteenth
century photographic subjects found their pictures 
appropriated for a variety of commercial uses. In this era, 
the public’s fascination with photographic images led to a
tremendous market in photographs of all kinds.81 
Photographers retained the negatives of portraits and made 
unauthorized copies to display as advertisements in their
studio windows.82 Sometimes photographers sold portraits 
to printers who used them on cards and other decorative 
items.83 Often they were sold to dry goods stores and junk 
shops.84 In the 1890s, the New York Tribune reported that
small shops “peddled the second hand stock of the cheapest
East Side photograph parlors . . . pictures of bridal couples 
in full regalia, stiff and unhappy-looking family groups.”85 
Collectors would amass pictures for as little as a penny a
piece, and there were rooms in homes that were “papered
with photographs.”86 Pictures “were dispensed from vending
79. HIRSCH, supra note 53, at 79. See generally HENISCH, supra note 61, at 13. 
80. ORVELL, AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 56, at 13 (“[T]he camera has
been the prime instrument for self-representation, capable of fashioning an
image for public consumption in a democratic republic where personal identity
and national identity were always to be invented and reinvented.”).
 81. Robert E. Mensel, “Kodakers Lying in Wait”: Amateur Photography and
the Right of Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 32 (1991).  
82. See, e.g., Moore v. Rugg, 46 N.W. 141 (Minn. 1890).
83. See, e.g., Pollard v. Photographic Co., L.R. 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888).
 84. See, e.g., Mensel, supra note 81, at 32. 
85. Id. (quoting Casual Observer, NEW YORK TRIBUNE, Dec. 18, 1898, at
illustrated supplement) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
86. Id. (quoting 18 PHOTOGRAPHIC TIMES & AM. PHOTOGRAPHER 560 (1888)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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machines, and even given away free in cigarette packs.”87 As 
a matter of law, it was not yet clear who “owned” the rights
to these images— the subject or the photographer—but in a
few decisions in the late 1800s, courts had begun to suggest 
that photographers breached an implied contract if they 
reproduced or sold a subject’s image without her consent.88 
Advertisers participated vigorously in this semi-illicit
market for photographs. A host of technological, practical,
and social factors made it difficult for advertisers to obtain 
photographic images through more systematic, licit 
channels. Photographs were costly to take and develop.89 
They required cumbersome equipment and could generally
be taken only in studios.90 There was not yet a commercial 
modeling industry—indeed, it was difficult to find subjects
who would actually consent to have their images used in
ads.91 Artists’ models occasionally posed for advertisements, 
but modeling was not considered to be a respectable 
occupation for women;92 models were suspected of being 
prostitutes on the side.93 In 1894, one commentator
contended that women who worked as artists’ models “do 
not allow their names to be spoken out of the studios, as 
there is an association with the word ‘model’ which makes a
woman looked at askance.”94 
Stage actors and other performers occasionally posed for 
advertisements, although this was relatively rare before 
87. Id.
 88. Moore v. Rugg, from 1890, established the rule that a photographer
employed to make a negative and photographs for another had no right to use
the negatives for his own purposes, under a theory of implied contract. Moore, 
46 N.W. at 141.  
89. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY 132 (2011) [hereinafter BANNER,
AMERICAN PROPERTY]. 
90. See generally HIRSCH, supra note 53, at ch. 2.
91. As historian Elspeth Brown writes, “these new photographically based
advertisements required models for their creation, yet there were . . . no such
professional models to be found.” Brown, From Artist’s Model to the ‘Natural
Girl,’ supra note 58, at 50. 
92. See id.
 93. See id. at 39.
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1900;95 Americans’ fascination with entertainment stars was 
largely a product of the twentieth century. In the late
nineteenth century, actors and actresses were widely held 
in social disrepute.96 The world of stage and show was 
associated with illicit sexuality and the bohemian
underworld,97 and actresses who sold their images to
advertisers were viewed with disdain. By putting their
bodies on display for pay, actresses flouted the middle-class
female ideal of modesty.98 Only women of questionable
morals, it was said, permitted their bodies to be looked upon 
by strangers.99 Advertisers that sought to create a
respectable image for their products generally did not use 
actresses’ portraits or endorsements.100 Society’s contempt
towards actresses who sold their images to advertisers was
both a function of repressive attitudes towards female 
sexuality and also a reflection of widespread cultural 
anxieties around mass consumption and the new consumer 
marketplace.101 
95. Historian Marlis Schweitzer notes that “despite middle-class hostility,” 
some advertisers did use the names and images of actresses. Marlis Schweitzer, 
“The Mad Search for Beauty”: Actresses’ Testimonials, the Cosmetics Industry, 
and the “Democratization of Beauty,” 4 J. OF THE GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA
255, 263 (2005). “By the early 1890s, actresses and other popular performers
endorsed an ever-widening range of products that included everything from
chocolates and cigars to dentifrice and patent medicine.” Id.
 96. See BENJAMIN MCARTHUR, ACTORS AND AMERICAN CULTURE, 1880-1920, at
125 (2000) (noting that in the 19th century some church groups viewed actors as
the “devil’s minions,” while among most groups, prejudice towards actors was 
“generally latent rather than active”). 
97. Many viewed the actress as a dangerous figure who “consorted with 
dangerous men, engaged in raucous public behavior, and played up her physical
appearance to advance her career.” Schweitzer, supra note 95, at 261. 
98. Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 441, 444 (1990); TAGG, supra note 55, at 104.
 99. See, e.g., Schweitzer, supra note 95, at 262. 
100. Id. at 264.
 101. Id. (“Rather than win consumers’ trust, actresses’ testimonials made
consumers skeptical about the products they promoted and the companies
selling them.”).  
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D.  The Morality of Consumption  
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the buying,
selling, and advertising of commercial products were highly
charged activities with negative moral and social 
connotations.102 Immersion in the consumer marketplace—
indulgence in the pleasures of spending and material 
acquisition—clashed with the longstanding middle-class
ethic of frugality and restraint. The public was caught
between the needs of an economy based on consumer
demands and the traditional association of material 
yearnings with vice and illicit temptation.103 
For much of the nineteenth century, the core values of
the middle-class had been anti-consumerist: plain living, 
perpetual work, and compulsive saving.104 People were
encouraged to focus on moral and spiritual development, not
external appearances, and to derive their honor and status 
from accomplishments, not possessions. The basis of this 
moral ideal was a rigid ethic of self-denial, self-control, and 
deferred gratification.105 This “Victorian superego”—
“internalized (and) systematically demanding,” in the words 
of historian Jackson Lears—was “engrained widely and 
deeply enough to constitute the mainspring of the dominant
culture.” 106 
102. As advertising scholar Pamela Laird has observed, Americans in this era
fought a contentious battle between spiritual and material values. LAIRD, supra
note 42, at 102-03. “Never before had such material opportunities presented
themselves to so many, and never since has outspoken . . . morality had such a
hold on those same people.” Id.
 103. DANIEL HOROWITZ, THE MORALITY OF SPENDING: ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
CONSUMER SOCIETY IN AMERICA, 1875-1940, at 32 (Ivan R. Dee 1992). 
104. Id. at xviii.  
105. These values characterized an industrializing economy and were oriented
around social and economic advance. As historian Lawrence Friedman writes, 
“[t]he ideal in every aspect of life, was self-discipline, moderation, and attention
to what Max Weber called the Protestant ethic. This ideal . . . was a pillar on
which capitalism, the free market, and economic growth necessarily rested.”
LAWRENCE MEIR FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 37 (2007).
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The proliferation of products in the last decade of the
1800s led to vociferous public attacks on consumerism and 
the perceived immorality of consumer spending.107 Critics
feared that the “upsurge in desire” created by the new
material abundance would destroy self-restraint and 
undermine the moral foundations of the self.108 Writers 
penned jeremiads and panegyrics lamenting the threats
that materialism posed to American society.109 
In his Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), Thorstein 
Veblen lambasted “pecuniary emulation” and “conspicuous 
consumption” as overindulgent and morally bankrupt.110 
“The girl who spends her allowance in candy and matinée
tickets is relaxing the moral fibre of her own character,” 
wrote one magazine author.111 Novels like the 1896 work 
The Damnation of Theron Ware112 and Sister Carrie, from
1900, warned of the consequences of consumer longings: 
sloth, greed, and loss of self.113 As Theodore Dreiser wrote of
his protagonist Carrie as she gazed into a department store
window, “there was nothing there . . . which she did not long 
to own. The dainty slippers and stockings, the delicately
Victorian respectability did not create a genuine cultural consensus;
rather, it played a key role in sustaining the hegemony of the dominant
social classes. Originating among the middle and upper bourgeoisie, 
Victorian ideals formed a collective conscience which inspired
allegiance from subordinate groups and brought coherence to a
politically fragmented society.
Id.
 107. Peter N. Stearns, Stages of Consumerism: Recent Work on the Issues of
Periodization, 69 J. MOD. HIST. 102, 103 (1997).  
108. Leach, supra note 38, at 101-02. 
109. HOROWITZ, supra note 103, at xvii (Historically, “Americans have worried
about the self-indulgence of consumers and the consequences of comfort,
affluence, and luxury. Moralists have argued that a rising or changing standard
of living endangered the health of America.”).
 110. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS; AN ECONOMIC 
STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS 88-89, 111 (Aakar Books 2005) (1899). 
111. Saving and Spending, HARPER’S BAZAAR, June 1906, at 573.  
112. Bronner, supra note 26, at 18-19.
 113. Id. at 17-18. 
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frilled skirts and petticoats . . . all touched her with
individual desire.”114 
The marketplace for goods was not only seen as a locus
of forbidden desire, but also of corruption, deceit, and
trickery.115 Although Americans shopped in department
stores, dry goods shops, and other established consumer 
emporia by the end of the nineteenth century, the selling of 
goods was still linked in the popular imagination to the
street hawkers and “confidence men” of an earlier era.116 
Advertising pitches of this time were often exaggerated if 
not totally false.117 “Between the end of the Civil War and 
the beginning of the twentieth century, advertisements for 
dubious health remedies, get-rich-quick schemes, and other 
outrageous fakery filled the pages of newspapers and 
magazines,” advertising scholar Julianne Sivulka writes.118 
Patent medicines—“cure-all” elixirs that were typically 
fraudulent if not toxic—were the most commonly advertised
product of the 1800s.119 “To bill it like a circus” was a
common expression among advertisers;120 to many
advertisers, the showman P.T. Barnum, known for his 
frauds on gullible patrons,121 “served as . . . one of the
shining examples of success attained through judicious 
advertising.”122 The advertisers of consumer products were
 114. THEODORE DREISER, SISTER CARRIE 17 (1900). See also Bronner, supra note 
26, at 20 (“[D]epartment store windows and hotel lobbies become studies in the
power and symbolism of things and wealth by showing the unrelenting force of
accumulation, the blinding qualities of display, and the commonly fleeting 
surface rewards.”). 
115. JACKSON LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
ADVERTISING IN AMERICA 89 (1994) [hereinafter LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE].
 116. ORVELL, THE REAL THING, supra note 67, at 53; see  LEARS, FABLES OF
ABUNDANCE, supra note 115, at 94-5. 
117. See POPE, supra note 32, at 186-87.
 118. SIVULKA, supra note 45, at 34. 
119. POPE, supra note 32, at 186-87. 
120. Laird, supra note 42, at 44.
 121. A.H. SAXON, P.T. BARNUM: THE LEGEND AND THE MAN 1-2 (1989). 
122. Laird, supra note 42, at 44 (quoting 4 PRINTERS’ INK 548 (1891)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the 
Transformation of Trademark Law, 38 N.M. L. REV. 1, 18 (2008) [hereinafter
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viewed by the public as little more than “liars and crooks,” 
bearing “an odor of snake oil.”123 
To the late nineteenth century middle-class sensibility,
trafficking in the sensual, earthly, and pedestrian “world of
goods” sat uneasily with anti-materialist ideals of frugality,
restraint, and self-control. Though Americans were
consuming products and product advertising, these 
activities were still viewed among many sectors of the
population with moral skepticism. Respectable persons did 
not engage in the needless acquisition of consumer products
nor succumb to material longings. They did not permit their 
pictures to be used in advertisements, let alone sell their
portraits for advertising use.
E.  The Crisis of Circulating Portraits 
Thus faced with significant difficulties obtaining
photographic portraits for ads, advertisers resorted to the 
photographic “black market.” In a practice that may seem
odd to the modern sensibility, they purchased or stole 
portraits or negatives from studio photographers, who sold
them without the consent of the subjects, and published 
them in advertisements for their products. Sometimes the
pictures were of public figures, such as authors, singers, and 
politicians, but more often, they were images of average 
citizens—ordinary men and women whose images were
fungible and ubiquitous, and who would be unlikely and
unable to take action against the appropriating
advertiser.124 The newspapers regularly reported stories of
ordinary people who quite literally woke up one morning to
find their photographs, without consent, emblazoned on ads 
public relations specialist, but he was also reviled for his crass manner and
blatant misrepresentations.”). 
123. STEPHEN FOX, THE MIRROR MAKERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ADVERTISING
AND ITS CREATORS 67 (1984) [hereinafter FOX, THE MIRROR MAKERS]. 
124. On the appropriation of photographs of famous people in this period, see 
Madow, supra note 44, at 152. Celebrity “[h]ats, dolls, canes, bicycles, theaters,
toys, dinnerware, furniture, cigars, liquors bore the likenesses, names, or special
symbols of various personalities.” (quoting Neil Harris, Who Owns Our Myths?
Heroism and Copyright in an Age of Mass Culture, 52 SOC. RES. 241, 251
(1985)).
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for patent medicines, complexion beautifiers,125 and 5 cent
cigars. In one notorious instance that became the subject of
a Supreme Court case, a photography studio sold a portrait
of a woman to a whiskey company, which used it in an ad
for its product.126 Occasionally advertisers undertook even
more aggressive and deceptive means. In a case from 1906
that made the news, a department store saleswoman was
approached by her co-worker, who told her that a customer 
was impressed by her beauty and wanted to have her 
portrait made. The customer promised her, in exchange for
her sitting for the portrait, copies of the photograph. She 
later found her picture in an ad for a patent medicine.127 
Advertisers typically chose a person’s portrait because
of the feelings that the image might invoke in potential
consumers. Portraits were selected not because they
represented a particular person or identity, but for their 
ability to generate emotions or associations that would 
enhance the product’s marketability and appeal. Often, the 
depicted individual represented idealized attributes, such as
youth, beauty, innocence, or sophistication. Pictures of
babies, stately grandmothers, and “pretty girls” were of
particular value in this regard.128 These images created a
“vague sense of desire” towards the advertised items and 
offered consumers a fantasy of what they might become or 
how they might feel if they acquired and used them.129 
Images of slender young women, dapper gentlemen, and
rosy-cheeked children acquired sudden value in the new
connotative economy of mass advertising, an industry that
traded in aspiration, emulation, and desire.  
By 1890, advertisers’ widespread use of 
misappropriated photographs, or so-called “circulating
portraits,” had generated a public outcry. The unauthorized 
use of the pictures of public figures and officials was 
125. CHI. TRIB., July 29, 1907.
126. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 188 (1909).  
127. Id.
 128. See, e.g., OHMANN, supra note 44, at 185.
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condemned as disrespectful and an insult to their dignity.130 
But it was advertisers’ “misuse of the faces of private
persons” that led to even greater outrage and a sense of
moral crisis.131 As one commentator lamented, it was “the
extreme of impudence for a firm or company to take the
photograph of any living person, and, without permission, 
use it as a label for their goods.”132 “Any likeness of anything
that is in Heaven above we may expect to see in these days
on city walls, slabsided rocks, or country barn doors, as the
sign or trade-mark of some quack medicine or shoddy 
merchandise,” mourned one critic.133 Attractive young
women were “liable to the shock of seeing [their pictures]
used [in an advertisement] to blazon the alleged merits of a
certain brand of cigar or whiskey,” and “prominent [citizens
had] . . . no immunity from the mortification of seeing
[their] photograph[s] run in the advertising columns of a
newspaper.”134 No one was immune from “the humiliation of 
this unbridled license by commercial pirates.”135 
In letters, testimonials, and other cultural texts from 
this era, the subjects of these “circulating portraits”
expressed strong feelings of embarrassment and shame.
They were appalled when they found that their images had 
been used in advertisements for consumer products. The
injury was all the more damaging when one’s photograph—
an intensely intimate representation of self, the “window
into the soul”—had been commercially exploited. Friends 
and acquaintances saw the ads and jeered at them, or were
shocked to find a person they had considered to be 
upstanding and respectable had willingly “sold her face” to
an advertiser. In 1904, a woman who found her image on a
set of commercial trading stamps alleged that the act
“‘humiliated’ her, ‘made her nervous,’” and caused her to be
130. See Advertising Brigands, 2 CASE AND COMMENT 2 (1895).
 131. A Recent Instance, OUTLOOK, Oct. 4, 1902, at 248.
 132. WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1902.
 133. Advertising Brigands, supra note 135, at 3 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
134. The Right of Privacy, ATL. CONST., Nov. 10, 1902, at 4. 
135. Brief in Support of Petition at 7, Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909). 
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laughed at by her peers.136 The New York Times wrote in
1905 that a local beauty queen suffered “mental anguish”
when her picture appeared in an ad without her consent.
She began to notice that some of her friends were looking at
her strangely.137 “I had such a sweet photograph taken of
myself the other day, which was in great demand by all my
admirers,” a woman complained to the editor of a popular 
magazine.138 “Imagine my intense horror and disgust at
.”139seeing it used for an advertisement . . . The 
unauthorized use of one’s photograph in an ad created “a
profound sense of exposure and violation.”140 
II. THE LAW AND THE CIRCULATING PORTRAIT 
It was not long before the “circulating portrait” problem
attracted the attention of the legal world. There was a
widespread feeling, two prominent lawyers wrote in 1890,
“that the law must afford some remedy for the unauthorized 
circulation of portraits of private persons.”141 The California
legislature passed a statute that made it a misdemeanor to
publish the portrait of any person in a newspaper without 
the individual’s consent.142 The publication of the picture of
Mrs. Grover Cleveland in an ad for patent medicine
prompted the introduction of a bill in Congress that would 
ban the exhibition of any photograph or likeness of a woman
without her authorization.143 A bill was introduced in the 
136. Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 104 N.Y.S. 1102, 1102-03 (App. Div.
1907). 
137. Belinda Briggs, A Monstrous Outrage, PUCK, Feb. 27, 1884, at 36.
 138. Id.
 139. Id.
 140. Mensel, supra note 81, at 32 (“[M]any people felt a profound sense of
exposure and violation upon being photographed, or upon finding their
photographs displayed and sold in photo shops, or used in advertisements,
without their consent.”).
 141. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 195. 
142. See Henry Billings Brown, The Liberty of the Press, 2 BRIEF OF PHI DELTA
PHI 128, 135 (1900).
 143. FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR
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New York legislature that would make it punishable by fine
and imprisonment of at least one year “to print or publish in
any newspaper, periodical, pamphlet, or book ‘any portrait 
or alleged portrait of any person or individual living in this
State without having first obtained his or her written 
consent.’”144 Supporters of the bill noted the inexcusable
“annoyance” that “had been inflicted upon innocent and 
quiet people, especially upon women, whose lineaments had 
been ‘disfigured and presented’ in public prints without
their consent.”145 
The victims of “circulating portraits” were also seeking
remedies in court for their dignitary and reputational 
injuries.146 Some brought suits for defamation. The claim in
these cases was that the unauthorized publication of one’s
picture in an advertisement lowered his or her reputation 
because of “its implied suggestion that the person allowed 
his or her name (or image) to be used for commercial 
gain.”147 By the turn of the century, many had also begun to
initiate tort claims for “invasion of privacy.” The privacy
tort was developed by legal theorists and courts in this era 
to address the crisis of the “circulating portrait” and remedy
what were described as the dignitary injuries caused by the
unauthorized use of a person’s picture in an advertisement.
Advertising exploitation of a person’s photograph was 
thought to degrade the individual by commodifying his
 144. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1897.
145. The Ellsworth Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1898, at 6.
146. Some brought successful actions for breach of contract against
photographers who made and circulated unauthorized reprints. But the breach
of contract action, as commentators observed, was not a viable remedy in every
“circulating portrait” case. It was only applicable when the advertiser had
obtained the image from the photographer, and it permitted suit only against
the photographer, not the advertiser, with whom the victim had no contractual
relationship. The offending use of the photo could be enjoined, and damages 
could be had for any pecuniary loss caused by the unauthorized use of the
image, but in most cases, unless an actor or other public figure was involved, the
individual’s photo had no market value. Embarrassment and shame—the
principal injuries alleged—were not compensable. See, e.g., Moore v. Rugg, 46
N.W. 141, 141 (Minn. 1890). 
147. ROCHELLE GURSTEIN, THE REPEAL OF RETICENCE: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S 
CULTURAL AND LEGAL STRUGGLES OVER FREE SPEECH, OBSCENITY, SEXUAL
LIBERATION, AND MODERN ART 163-64 (1996).
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image.148 The commercialization of one’s persona was
regarded as an affront to one’s dignity, sense of self, and
“privacy.”149 
A.  “Libeled By Advertising” 
In the view of many late nineteenth century legal
theorists, the libel tort offered the most viable legal means
to combat the “circulating portrait” problem. The essence of
the libel tort—an ancient tort dating back to the earliest 
history of the common law—is the protection of
reputation.150 To prevail in a libel suit, the plaintiff had to 
demonstrate that the defendant published a false and 
defamatory statement.151 A defamatory statement “expose[d]
a person to hatred or contempt . . . injure[d] him in his
profession or trade or cause[d] him to be shunned by his
.”152neighbors . . .  Traditionally, defamatory statements 
consisted of moral accusations. Imputations of criminality,
deceitfulness, or sexual misconduct were considered so
damaging to one’s reputation as to be libelous per se. Insofar 
as the unauthorized use of a person’s portrait in an
advertisement imputed a willingness to exploit one’s image
that was seen as illicit, acts of commercial appropriation, it
was said, “would doubtless be a libel in all [the] states.”153 
In the many libel claims brought over misappropriated 
portraits, plaintiffs alleged that the unauthorized use of
their images in advertisements created an impression of
them that was false and immoral and that cast them into
disrepute. In a number of cases, the plaintiff argued that 
the advertisement was defamatory because it falsely 
148. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
149. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as An Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 987 (1964). 
150. Developments in the Law: Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 877 (1956). 
151. MARTIN L. NEWELL, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, LIBEL AND SLANDER IN CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL CASES AS ADMINISTERED IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 37 (1890).
 152. Id.
 153. John A. Jameson, The Legal Relations of Photographs, 8 AM. LAW. REG. 1, 
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associated her picture with a disreputable product.154 In a
1909 libel case, the picture of a senator was published in an
ad for a patent medicine called “Doan’s Kidney Pills.”155 The 
senator was not a user of the product and had not endorsed 
it.156 The court held that he had a cause of action for libel 
because patent medicines were known to be fraudulent. 157 
Another genre of “libel by advertising” cases involved
false testimonials. In a common practice at the time,
advertisers appropriated portraits and published them
alongside false testimonials endorsing products.158 In the
libel suits that ensued, the claims were that the 
advertisements were defamatory because they suggested 
that the subjects were liars.159 The famous 1905 case 
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. involved the 
publication of the plaintiff’s photo in an ad for life insurance
that appeared in the Atlanta Constitution. 160 The newspaper 
154. In a few cases, the purportedly false and defamatory allegation was
contained within the four corners of the photograph. In 1901, a young woman
brought suit for libel against a magazine that published a doctored photo of her,
a picture of her head on top of the body of a woman dressed in “fancy short 
skirts.” Magazine’s Sale Stopped: Injunction Granted in Suit Over Publication of
Alleged Garbled Photograph, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1901, at 16. The court
concluded that the publication was false and defamatory, as it suggested that
she was a woman of questionable sexual morals. Id.
155. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 365-66 (Ky. 1909).
 156. See id.
 157. Id. at 366; see also Martin v. The Picayune, 40 So. 376 (La. 1906);
Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891). A
similar conclusion was reached in the 1904 case Morrison v. Smith, a libel claim 
involving the plaintiff’s photo published in a magazine advertisement for a
risqué novel. Morrison v. Smith, 69 N.E. 725 (N.Y. 1904). The woman had not
consented to this use of her picture. Id. at 726. The court agreed with the
plaintiff that the juxtaposition of the photo and the advertising text was
libelous, as “it exposed the plaintiff to contempt and to ridicule, if it did not
imply disgraceful conduct.” Id. at 727. 
158. Statements from “typical consumers” were included in advertisements,
along with their photos, to create a sense of identification with potential
customers; expert testimonials were included to bolster the credibility and
veracity of the advertised item, which was particularly coveted by
manufacturers when it came to dubious products such as patent medicines. See, 
e.g., OHMANN, supra note 44, at 187.
 159. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
160. Id. at 68-69.
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had obtained the photo, without the plaintiff’s
authorization, from a photography studio where he had
earlier sat for his picture.161 The photograph was published 
above a testimonial endorsing the product; the plaintiff did 
not own, let alone endorse, the defendant’s life insurance
policy.162 The court held that the plaintiff had a cause of 
action for libel because his acquaintances would likely
conclude that he had accepted money to make statements 
about a policy he did not own, that he “lied for a
consideration,” making him “odious to every decent 
individual.”163 
In most “libel by advertising” cases, the chief argument 
was that one’s very appearance in an ad was defamatory,
regardless of the product that was advertised or any words 
associated with it.164 It was not merely the public association 
with a commercial product that was humiliating, but the
assumption that viewers would make when they saw the
advertisement—that the plaintiff had consented to have her 
photo used for advertising purposes.165 Plaintiffs “were
scandalized by the possibility that people would assume
they actually endorsed commercial products.”166 The
implication that a person had “sold her face” to a
commercial advertiser would “disgrace her and lay her open 
to the contempt and ridicule of friends, neighbors, and
strangers.”167 
In Henry v. Cherry & Webb, the plaintiff’s picture
appeared, without his consent, in an advertisement for coats 
in a Providence newspaper.168 He sued for libel, claiming 
that appearing before the public in a commercial context
161. Id. at 69.
 162. Id.
 163. Id. at 81.
 164. See, e.g., id.
 165. See, e.g., id.
 166. GURSTEIN, supra note 147, at 164.
167. Brief for Petitioner at 46, Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909) (No.
191). 
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caused him to be scorned and shunned by the community.169 
In a 1911 case, Munden v. Harris, a Missouri appeals court
held that a boy whose portrait had been used in an ad for a 
jewelry store had a cause of action for libel.170 The use of his
image “as an advertising aid to business” led viewers to
make false assumptions about his character, and the 
plaintiff suffered “vexation and . . . ridicule.”171 
The claims of reputational injury were even stronger 
when the subject of the portrait was a woman. Because the 
public display of a woman’s face and body, particularly in a
commercial context, carried overtones of illicit sexuality, as 
Thomas Huff writes, “attaching a woman’s likeness to a
commercial product” was “seen as equivalent to the loss of a
woman’s virtue or at least an invitation to the loss of that 
virtue.”172 In Kunz v. Allen, a dry goods store surreptitiously
took a film of a woman and used it an advertisement.173 The 
Kansas Supreme Court observed that the unauthorized use 
of the woman’s image on film would bring her into
disrepute, as it would lead viewers to assume that she was a
paid model,174 calling her morals into question. “No woman
of ordinary refinement would fail to be humiliated by the
unauthorized publication of her portrait” in an
advertisement for goods, observed one commentator.175 “No
judge will do violence to legal principles . . . if he recognizes 
169. See id.
170. Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Mo. Ct. App.
1911).
 171. Id.
 172. Thomas Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L. REV. 777, 785
(1979). As Lisa Pruitt has noted, in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the “vast majority of women who turned to defamation law did so to
get redress for statements that impugned their chastity.” Lisa Pruitt, Her Own
Good Name: Two Centuries of Talk About Chastity, 63 MD. L. REV. 401, 419
(2004).
173. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 532 (Kan. 1918).
 174. Id.
 175. Rich, supra note 29, at 239. Some actresses even argued that having their
pictures in advertisements was injurious to their reputations. In 1889, an
actress began a well-publicized libel suit in New York state court to recover
$10,000 damages, for the unauthorized use of pictures of her in an
advertisement. Are Her Pictures Libels?, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1889, at 3. 
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. . . that this inevitable humiliation which every woman 
must feel . . . is sufficient to make [the publication] 
defamatory.”176 
This was the argument in Peck v. Tribune, a libel case
that reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909.177 Peck
involved the unauthorized use of a woman’s portrait in an 
advertisement for whiskey.178 The plaintiff, Elizabeth Peck,
was a widow who lived in the small town of Mount Auburn,
Iowa.179 Mrs. Peck had a photograph of herself taken in a 
portrait studio in a small town north of Mount Auburn in 
1904.180 The photographer, without Peck’s knowledge or
consent, sold the negatives to the makers of Duffy’s Pure
Malt Whiskey, which used them in an ad touting the
whiskey’s properties as a health tonic.181 “Nurse and 
Patients Praise Duffy’s—Mrs. A. Schuman, One of Chicago’s
Most Capable and Experienced Nurses, Pays an Eloquent 
Tribute to the Great Invigorating, Life-Giving, and Curative
Properties of Duffy’s Pure Malt Whisky,” read the ad’s 
headline.182 
Under the headline appeared a photographic portrait of 
a woman with the caption, ‘Mrs. A. Schuman,’ with an
address in Chicago. “After years of constant use of your pure
malt whiskey, both by myself and as given to patients in my
capacity as nurse, I have no hesitation in recommending it,”
read the testimonial below the portrait.183 In reality, the
person in the picture was not Mrs. Shuman but the 
plaintiff, Mrs. Peck. Peck was not a nurse, and she was a 
176. Rich, supra note 29, at 239.
177. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 188 (1909).
 178. Id.
179. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1908) (No.
191). 
180. Transcript of Record, at 16, 20-21, Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185
(1907) (No. 480).  
181. Id.
 182. Id.
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total abstainer from alcohol.184 The advertisement was 
published in the Chicago Tribune.185 
Peck, outraged, sued the Tribune and another 
newspaper, Hearst’s Chicago American, for libel.186 Peck 
alleged that the advertisement subjected her—a woman of 
“spotless reputation and blameless life”187—to humiliation 
and the “scorn, contempt, and ridicule” of her peers,188 as 
members of the community would assume that Peck had 
willingly posed for the ad. The ad was a “direct assault upon 
her character” because it presented her as a person “who
ha[d] loaned or sold her face for advertising purposes.”189 
The trial court concluded that Mrs. Peck had a cause of
action for libel. The Seventh Circuit reversed, but the U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed.190 In an opinion by Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, the Court concluded that an “appreciable
fraction” of the population could very well regard Mrs. Peck
with contempt, both for appearing to have endorsed 
whiskey, a product that some might view as disreputable, 
and for appearing to have “sold her face” for advertising
purposes.191 While there were some people who might view 
posing for an ad as morally unproblematic, being associated
with advertisements could very well “hurt [one’s] standing 
with a considerable and respectable class in the
community.”192 Peck had “indisputably suffered a wrong” to
her reputation.193 By “the publication of her picture [in an 
advertisement], people who recognize the portrait will [be
184. Id. at 47.
 185. Id. at 2.
 186. Id.
187. Brief in Support of Petition at 2, Peck v. Tribune, 214 U.S. 185 (1909). 
188. Id. at 46.
189. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909).  
190. Peck v. Tribune, 154 F. 330 (7th Cir. 1907), aff’d, 214 U.S. 185 (1909).
 191. Peck, 214 U.S. at 190. 
192. Id. The Peck case instituted what is now known as the “substantial and
respectable minority” doctrine in libel law: that a statement need only injure
one’s esteem in the eyes of some portion of the community to make out a cause
of action for libel. 
193. Peck, 154 F. at 330.  
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led to] think she has loaned her face . . . in a way a self 
respecting person would not have consented to.”194 
B.  The “Circulating Portrait” and the Right to Privacy 
By the first decade of the twentieth century, there was a 
widespread sentiment that the unauthorized use of a 
person’s image in an advertisement could damage that
person’s reputation for character and good morals. It could
also injure one’s feelings and sense of dignity. The
defamation tort provided a remedy only for social or 
“relational” injuries—to one’s standing in one’s community 
and one’s relationship with one’s peers.195 It did not remedy
internal injuries, that is, injuries to one’s emotions and 
sense of self. There were a number of cases, legal 
commentators observed, in which the victims of advertising
appropriation suffered serious indignity but were unable to
meet defamation law’s strict requirement that a publication
subject one to public opprobrium—to “hatred, scorn, and 
contempt.” This lacuna in the law of libel led to the
development of a dignity-based commercial appropriation
tort under the rubric of a “right to privacy.”
In their famous 1890 law review article “The Right to
Privacy,” the Boston lawyers Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis proposed a tort cause of action that would permit 
an injunction and damages for emotional and dignitary
harms caused by material that publicized one’s “private life” 
in a way that caused mental anguish or embarrassment.196 
The article, as is well-known, was a response to the recent 
development of “yellow journalism” and gossip columns in
the press.197 It was also a reaction to the advertising
appropriation problem—what Warren and Brandeis 
194. Id.
195. As Warren and Brandeis wrote, defamation redressed the damage “done
to the individual in his external relations to the community, by lowering him in
the estimation of his fellows.” Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 197. 
196. Id. at 216.  
197. Amy Gajda, What if Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a Senator’s
Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage that Led to “The Right to Privacy,”








































2013] FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 1153
described as the “unauthorized circulation of portraits of 
private persons.”198 Insofar as a photograph of one’s face was
seen as an intimate representation of the self—as 
something that was “private”—its unauthorized publication,
particularly in a commercial context, constituted an 
invasion of one’s self and one’s right to privacy.199 
The indignity caused by advertising appropriation was,
in part, the indignity of being publicized against one’s will.
The culture of that time valued modesty and reticence, not 
fame and exposure.200 The indignity was also a product of
the misrepresentation: it was an affront to be publicly
identified as an endorser of products when one was not.201 
Above all, it was an insult to have one’s image commodified.
The use of a person’s image in an advertisement was
degrading because it reduced that person’s identity to a
thing, a fungible object no different from the products it was
used to shill.202 
198. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 195.
199. In the article, Warren and Brandeis devoted significant attention to the
“circulating portrait” problem and opined that the question of “whether our law
will recognize and protect the right to privacy in this [respect] must soon come
before our courts for consideration.” Id. at 196. They wrote that the right of a
person to prevent such “public portraiture” represented the “simplest case” for a
legal right to privacy. Id. at 196, 213. 
200. Rochelle Gurstein has noted the “culture of reticence” in this era in which
private life was valued as the locus of intimacy. People did not seek publicity— 
to expose the private was to devalue intimacy. GURSTEIN, supra note 147, at 32.
201. In the words of John Henry Wigmore:
I am entitled to be judged in public by my actual opinions and
utterances. To have false ones ascribed to me is an injury to my feelings
of self-respect. . . . The right to privacy is really a right to be protected
against a certain kind of injury to feelings. . . . The essential thing is
that I do not entertain the convictions falsely ascribed me—that it
injures my just feelings of self respect to be classed where I do not care
to be classed—and that I am entitled to be protected against such an
unauthorized misrepresentation of my personality. 
John H. Wigmore, The Right Against False Attribution of Belief or
Utterance, 4 KY. L.J. 3, 8 (1916). 
202. As Edward Bloustein pointed out, “[i]n these cases what is demeaning 
and humiliating is the commercialization of an aspect of personality.” Bloustein,
supra note 149, at 987-88.
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1. Privacy and the Anticommodification Ethos. To 
understand why the unauthorized commercial exploitation
of the persona would be regarded as a serious indignity—in
the words of one commentator, an affront to the self “more
formidable and more painful in its consequences than an
actual bodily assault might be”203—we need to know
something about the cultural anxieties around
“commodification.” 
As critics of that time lamented, the United States was 
becoming a “commodity civilization,” a culture of
superficiality and materialism “submerged beneath the
surface allure of having and displaying possessions.”204 
Spiritual and moral values seemed to be lost in the crass 
pursuit of getting and spending.205 “The commercial and 
money-making spirit of the age,” observed one writer, had
infected “every department of human exertion.”206 
Virtually every domain of life seemed to be overtaken by 
consumer values. Consumer products “invaded” the home; 
dinner tables were piled with commercially produced 
foodstuffs and mass produced clothes hung in closets. At a
time when women were regarded as the guardians of the
home, the widespread commercial use of female images was 
seen as the most egregious example of the intrusion of
market forces into the sacred domains of personal life. As 
one commentator observed, it is a piece of glaring bad taste
“to invade the sanctity of the home circle and hold up to
public gaze . . . the portrait of young women who in nowise 
court publicity, and in whom the public has no interest 
except as they are pretty women.”207 
This alleged commodification of human existence not
only undermined the moral fabric but also the possibility of
203. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 450 (N.Y. 1902)
(Gray, J., dissenting). 
204. Bronner, supra note 27, at 13. 
205. LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE, supra note 115, at 387. 
206. Denis O’Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 446-47 (1902).
 207. CLAUDE COOKMAN, AMERICAN PHOTOJOURNALISM: MOTIVATIONS AND
MEANINGS 69 (2009) (quoting A Step too Far, JOURNALIST, June 7, 1884, at 3, 3)
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autonomy and free will.208 Many feared that people would no 
longer be able to define themselves in terms of chosen
values and traditions but would instead be controlled by 
consumer yearnings and persuasive and seductive 
advertising.209 Advertisements had become so pervasive and
voluminous that they intruded on people’s thoughts and 
consciousness. As Samuel Hopkins Adams warned in 
Collier’s magazine, “[t]here is no hour of waking life in
which we are not besought, incited, or commanded to buy 
something of somebody.”210 The ideal of the self-made man 
appeared to be besieged in a world where people were
exhorted to define themselves through conspicuous
consumption and the ownership of goods.211 Individuality 
would be lost as people sought to create standardized 
identities through the purchase of standardized, mass-
produced products.
The “circulating portrait” emblematized these fears. The 
appropriated advertising image exploited the depicted
individual by turning her photograph into an object and a 
spectacle. In these ads, the actual identity of the depicted
subject was meaningless; the image was valuable insofar as 
it could evoke a particular mood, status, or feeling to appeal 
to consumers and sell products. Human likenesses were
becoming empty, fungible symbols of desire, and selfhood 
and individuality were destroyed as living people were
reduced to being mere “labels for goods.”212 Men and women
who had in no way courted profit or publicity were being
“enslaved,” their “physiognom[ies] . . . pirated to tout
another person’s business.”213 
208. See, e.g., Lears, From Salvation to Self-Realization, supra note 41, at 7.
209. “As more and more people became enmeshed in the market’s web of
interdependence,” historian Jackson Lears has written, “liberal ideals of
autonomous selfhood became ever more difficult to sustain.” Id.
210. Samuel Hopkins Adams, The New World of Trade: The Art of Advertising, 
COLLIER’S, May 22, 1909, at 13.  
211. See LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE, supra note 115, at 37. 
212. WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1902.
 213. Wilbur Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 695
(1912). As Elizabeth Peck’s lawyers wrote in their appeal to the Supreme Court
in Peck v. Tribune: 
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2. “The Right to Privacy.” To Warren and Brandeis and 
other elite Northern intellectuals of the time, the
“circulating portrait” was a testament to the apparent
commercialization and degradation of all that was noble
and sacred.214 Warren and Brandeis lamented advertisers’
exploitation of portraits, particularly portraits of women; 
such acts were “gross and depraved.”215 Market values 
threatened to overtake substantive values. For this reason, 
they wrote, it was critical that the law protect the
intangible, non-fungible, “spiritual” dimensions of personal 
identity, including one’s thoughts, emotions, and visual
likeness.216 
The thrust of the Warren and Brandeis argument was
that a “right to privacy” already existed in the common
law.217 Warren and Brandeis cited cases in which the 
publication of personal photographs,218 etchings,219 
drawings,220 and private correspondence221 were enjoined 
under common law theories of copyright or breach of
contract. These intellectual property rights, they argued, 
The human face was not meant to be bandied and “blown about the
pendent world.” It is like precious jewels in a casket. If the owner
wishes to bring them forth to charm and dazzle the world it is his 
privilege to do so; if he choose[s] to keep them safe hidden away from
all curious eyes it is likewise his privilege so to use them. There is a
limit beyond which the public may not go. There is an enchanted circle 
which vulgar feet may not profane. The right to privacy like that 
flaming angel that forever guards the gates of Paradise stands sentinel 
over every private citizen and says to all the world, “Thus far thou shalt
go and no farther. Buy, sell and get gain, traffic and trade, how you
will, but you may not along with your wares and merchandise, your
pills, Perunas, and Duffy whiskies, print and sell without consent the
portraits of private persons to assist you in your business.”  
Brief for Petitioner at 58, Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909).  
214. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30.
 215. Id. at 214.
 216. Id. at 197.
 217. Id. at 193.
 218. See id. at 208-09.
 219. See id. at 201.
 220. See id.




































2013] FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 1157
were examples of a broader right to prevent aspects of one’s 
intimate self from unwanted display.222 Yet the “right to
privacy” was not a right of property, they emphasized, but 
rather a personal right.223 This effort to detach privacy from
property was motivated, in significant part, by a desire to
secure damages for victims of advertising appropriation 
whose images had negligible, if any, commercial value.224 
Damages in cases involving property rights were measured 
by traditional market tests of unjust enrichment or lost
profits. Under the proposed privacy tort, victims of
advertising appropriation could recover damages for mental
distress and anguish even if their images had no
ascertainable market value, as was generally the case with
ordinary people whose images had been exploited.225 This 
move was controversial at the time because the common law
typically did not provide recovery for emotional injuries that
were unrelated to other established causes of action.226 
Even if one’s photograph did have market value, the
idea of a face as a form of property that could be bought and 
sold for money was repugnant to the genteel Victorian
sensibility. As one writer posited in 1902:
We may discard entirely the suggestion that a lady has any thing
in the nature of a property right in her form or features that is
invaded by the circulation of her picture against her will or
without her consent. That would be altogether too coarse and too 
material a suggestion to apply to one of the noblest and most
attractive gifts that Providence has bestowed on the human race. 
A woman’s beauty, next to her virtues, is her earthly crown, but . .
. it would be a degradation to hedge it about by rules and
principles applicable to property in land or chattels.227 
The “right to privacy” was created to preserve a terrain for
the self that was “beyond the reach of market forces.”228 
222. See id.
 223. Id.
 224. See, e.g., Post, supra note 16, at 665.
 225. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 213-14.
 226. Post, supra note 16, at 654-55. 
227. O’Brien, supra note 206, at 439.
 228. Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, supra note 14, at 216. 
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3. Appropriation as a Dignitary Harm. By 1900, at the
height of the “circulating portrait” crisis, a number of cases 
began to be brought in state courts alleging a “right to
privacy” in one’s image. Virtually all of the cases involved
photographs used without consent in advertisements for 
consumer goods.229 The injury alleged was “offense,”
“mortification,” and indignity caused by publicity in a
commercial context.  
Courts held that plaintiffs could recover damages for
emotional and dignitary harms.230 In Marks v. Jaffa, from
1893, the defendant published in his newspaper, as part of a
circulation scheme, a picture of two actors from the Yiddish 
theater, with an invitation to readers to vote on who was 
the more popular of the two.231 The court upheld an
injunction, citing the Warren and Brandeis article and 
noting that “[t]he law affords a remedy for the unauthorized 
circulation of portraits of private persons.”232 In Foster-
Millburn v. Chinn, the picture of a senator was published 
alongside a false testimonial in an ad for patent medicine.233 
The court held that “a person is entitled to the right of
privacy as to his picture, and that the publication of the
picture of a person without his consent, as a part of an
advertisement for the purpose of exploiting the publisher’s
business, is a violation of the right of privacy.”234 While “[i]t
has become a custom in the press to publish the pictures of
prominent public men,” the court noted, “[i]t is a very 
different thing for a manufacturer to use without authority
such a man’s picture to advertise his goods.” 235 
229. See Larremore, supra note 213, at 694-95 (“Upon the very face of the 
cases an important distinction appears between those of them that consider
privacy pure and simple and those dealing with privacy conjoined with a
pecuniary or business interest.”). 
230. See, e.g., Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (1893); Foster-Milburn Co. v.
Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909).
 231. Marks, 26 N.Y.S. at 909.  
232. Id. at 909.
 233. Foster-Milburn Co., 120 S.W. at 365.
 234. Id.
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The seminal 1905 case Pavesich v. New England Life 
Insurance Co. involved the unauthorized use of the picture 
of the plaintiff, an artist, in an ad for life insurance.236 The 
plaintiff’s picture was placed next to a false testimonial: “In
my healthy and productive period of life I bought insurance
in the New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., of Boston,
Mass., and to-day my family is protected and I am drawing
an annual dividend on my paid-up policies.”237 The artist
was not famous by any means. His picture was most likely
chosen because it suggested health, wisdom, and
respectability: the robust, bespectacled plaintiff bore a 
resemblance to Theodore Roosevelt, who was president at 
the time. As we have seen, Pavesich brought a claim for
libel, alleging reputational harm—that the ad “brought him
into ridicule before the world.”238 He also alleged mental 
distress and dignitary injuries—an invasion of his “right to
privacy.”239 
In Pavesich, the Georgia Supreme Court became the 
first state high court to recognize a tort right to privacy. The 
Court concluded that “the law recognizes, within proper
limits, as a legal right, the right of privacy, and that the
publication of one’s picture without his consent by another 
as an advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing the 
profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this 
right.”240 The Court described the “legal wrong . . .
perpetrated by the unauthorized use of . . . pictures for
advertising purposes.”241 The advertiser’s use of the 
plaintiff’s picture was dehumanizing and an encroachment 
on his “privacy” because it reduced him to a label for
goods.242 His photograph had become a fungible commodity
circulated wantonly in the marketplace; the advertisement
could be posted “upon the streets [above] the bar of the
236. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68 (Ga. 1905).
 237. Id. at 69.  
238. Id. at 69.
 239. Id. at 69.  
240. Id. at 80-81.
 241. Id. at 80.
 242. See id.
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saloon keeper, or [on] the walls of a brothel.”243 To the
advertiser and to the readers who saw his image, Pavesich’s 
unique identity as a human was meaningless. 244 
4. The Roberson Case. As was the case in the “libel by
advertising” suits, the most sympathetic “invasion of
privacy” plaintiffs were women. In 1904, a young woman
who claimed that her picture was used without her consent
in a corset advertisement brought suit in a New York state
court on the theory that such unwanted publicity was an 
affront to her dignity and “the violation of the right of a
decent woman to privacy.”245 That year, the New York Times
noted the efforts of a young woman from Rochester to 
prevent the continued use of her image in an ad for a beauty
product.246 The image “represents a woman, of whom only
the face and one arm are visible, parting the curtains of a
circular screen standing in a bathtub, and looking out
toward the spectator.”247 The Times noted that although the 
image was not in its own right “indecent,” it was one that 
“any decent woman would most strongly resent being 
publicly shown.”248 
The public outrage around the well-known 1903 case
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. attests to the popular 
feeling that the commercial exploitation of a woman’s image
was a debasement of her virtue that affronted her 
reputation, honor, and sense of self.249 The image of a young
woman, Abigail Roberson, had been used without her 
consent in an ad for Franklin Mills flour.250 25,000 copies of 
the ad were made and “conspicuously posted” in various 
locations, including “stores, warehouses, [and] saloons.”251 
243. Id.
 244. Id.
 245. The Right to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1904, at 6.
 246. Id.
 247. Id.
 248. Id. 
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The ad contained a drawing of her that was made from a
photograph, an extremely “good” likeness.252 Because the
drawing was so realistic, her friends were able to recognize 
her identity.253 
The association with a commercial flour product was so 
“distasteful” to Roberson that she suffered extreme mental 
distress and had to be treated by a doctor.254 When Roberson
was informed of the use of her likeness she “suffered a 
severe nervous shock, was confined to her bed, and
compelled to employ a physician.”255 She was “greatly
humiliated by the scoffs and jeers of persons who have
recognized her face.”256 She brought suit against the
advertiser, the Rochester Folding Box Company, on the 
theory that the advertisement had invaded her “privacy.”257 
She sought damages in the amount of $15,000 and that the
defendants be enjoined from the further publication or
circulation of the ad.258 
The trial court rejected the defendant’s motion to
dismiss Roberson’s claim for invasion of privacy, noting that
“[a]ny modest and refined young woman might naturally be
extremely shocked and wounded in seeing a lithographic
likeness of herself posted in public places as an
advertisement of some enterprising business firm.”259 The 
intermediate court of appeals affirmed,260 yet the highest
court in New York reversed the decision.261 The court 
refused to recognize a right of privacy, expressing concern






 257. Id. at 443.
 258. Id. at 442.
259. Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 65 N.Y.S. 1109, 1110 (Sup. Ct. 
1900). 
260. Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 64 A.D. 30, 41 (N.Y. App. Div.
1901). 
261. Roberson, 65 N.E. at 443.
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While most persons would much prefer to have a good likeness of 
themselves appear in a responsible periodical or leading
newspaper rather than upon an advertising card or sheet, the
doctrine which the courts are asked to create for this case would 
apply as well to one publication as to the other.262 
The court also opined that recognizing a right to privacy 
would unleash a floodgate of litigation.263 Such sweeping
changes in policy were better suited for the legislative body;
the legislature “could very well interfere and arbitrarily
provide that no one should be permitted for his own selfish 
purpose to use the picture or the name of another for 
advertising purposes without his consent.”264 
Popular publications were flooded with letters and
articles attacking the decision. One writer expressed the 
prevailing mood when he observed that it was “outrageous
that modest women who in no way put themselves before 
the public” could “be dragged into notoriety by any 
adventurer who thinks he can fill his pockets by exploiting 
them.”265 A woman should have a right not to “have her 
features used and hawked about as a trade mark without 
her consent.”266 “The handsome, modest, and retiring young
woman who finds her features paraded on flour sacks or
cigaret[te] wrappers is entitled to a more effective remedy
than the one the New York court of appeals says she can
resort to,” asserted one reader of the Chicago Tribune. 267 “If 
there . . . is[] no law now to cover these savage and horrible
practices,” wrote the New York Times, “then the decent





265. The Right of Privacy: Georgia’s Highest Court Makes Ruling Adverse to
that of Judge Parker, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1905, at 4 [hereinafter The Right of
Privacy, L.A. TIMES]. 
266. The Right to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1904, at 6. 
267. The Right of Privacy, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 1902, at 12.
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In response, the New York state legislature passed a
Civil Rights Law—a so-called “privacy” statute—that made
it both a misdemeanor and a tort to publish, without
consent, a person’s “name, portrait or picture” for the
purposes of “trade.”269 Damages were awarded not for lost
profits, but for emotional and dignitary harms.270 Recovery
could be had for the indignities caused when an advertiser 
“ma[d]e use of a portrait of a beautiful woman to attract
attention to some article of trade”271—when one’s picture
“was unauthorizedly published or used . . . in connection
with the advertisement of some patent medicine or some 
other commodity which the advertiser was interested in
selling.”272 As historian Rochelle Gurstein has observed, the
law was not really a “privacy” statute, but was framed in 
“narrow terms because it was formulated to placate public 
anger over the brazen exploitation of Roberson’s likeness.”273 
For this reason the law addressed only what the judge had 
called the “commercial and money-making spirit of the age” 
and not a broader right to privacy, a true “right to be let
alone.”274 
In 1904, Virginia enacted a similar anti-appropriation
statute.275 In addition, by 1911, several states had 
recognized a common law cause of action for “invasion of
privacy”; many cases in which a right to privacy was 
recognized involved advertising exploitation of photographs 
and other personal images.276 
269. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2009). 
270. Frederick R. Kessler, A Common Law for the Statutory Era: The Right of
Publicity and New York’s Right of Privacy Statute, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 951,
960 (1986).
271. Thompson v. Tillford, 137 N.Y.S. 523, 523 (App. Div. 1912).  
272. Moser v. Press Pub. Co., 109 N.Y.S. 963, 965 (Sup. Ct. 1908). 
273. GURSTEIN, supra note 147, at 159.
 274. Id.
 275. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2897a (West 1904).
276. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905); Foster-
Millburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909); Schulman v. Whitaker, 42
So. 227, 228 (La. 1906); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1911).
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III. THE TRANSITIONAL ERA, 1905-1920  
By the early twentieth century, social and legal 
institutions had turned their attention to the “circulating
portrait” problem and the cultural changes that it seemed to
represent. The tort of defamation and the newly created tort
of invasion of privacy were seen by many as a means to
thwart the perceived moral corrosion that accompanied the 
advent of a mass consumer society. Through libel and
privacy lawsuits, the victims of “circulating portraits” would 
be compensated for injuries to their dignity and reputations,
and advertisers would be deterred from such degrading uses
of the human persona. The law would be used to make a
moral statement that the unauthorized commercial 
exploitation of a person’s image, particularly one’s
photographic image, violated the norms of respectable
society. 
Yet even as this legal regime was being established, it 
was also being undermined.277 In the same era that the
“libel by advertising” cases were coming through the courts
and the privacy tort was being recognized, public attitudes
towards advertising, consumer culture, and the 
commercialization of the persona were beginning a historic
shift. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
advertising and mass consumption were being resignified in
the popular imagination.278 In a world where paid models, 
entertainment celebrities, and conspicuous consumption 
were becoming central to middle-class life, the idea that the 
unauthorized advertising use of a person’s image inevitably
assaulted that person’s dignity and reputation was 
beginning to seem anachronistic. 
A.  The New Order  
The traces of this new order can be seen in the Roberson
decision itself.279 Although the majority in Roberson based 
its decision primarily on the grounds that recognition of a
277. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
278. See discussion infra Part III.B.  
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“right to privacy” would inhibit publishing and open the
floodgates of litigation, it also hinted at another basis for
the decision: Abigail Roberson had not truly been injured.280 
The court noted that the portrait was a “good one”—
attractive and not unflattering in the least.281 Instead of 
being humiliated, the court speculated, some women might 
consider having their images in an ad, particularly if the
picture was desirable, to be pleasant and “agreeable.”282 
Some women “would have appreciated the compliment to
their beauty implied in the selection of the picture.”283 
The court’s suggestion that Roberson actually enjoyed 
the publicity—that she should have felt “complimented by
the evidently sincere flattery of the advertiser”284—was seen 
by many to be offensive and outrageous. “The Court of
Appeals has told the plaintiff in advance that her grievance
is fantastic and illusory. If she should happen to pine away
and die of shame on account of such an exhibition of her in 
public, she will have the consolation of knowing that, in the
opinion of that court, she ought to have taken the exposure
rather as a compliment.”285 As one contributor to the New 
York Times wrote mockingly, “[i]f the court’s wife is 
lithographed in a cut designed to show off the beauty of the
P.T. Corset, or the court’s daughter finds her picture
engraved on the wrapper of each bottle of Dr. Soakum’s 
Celebrated Liver Cure,” “the court . . . would feel naturally
gratified that these ladies were so honored.”286 
Yet a few commentators seemed to agree with the
court’s implication that Roberson’s injuries were perhaps 
280. Id. at 443.
 281. Id.
 282. Id.
 283. Id. 
284. The Right of Privacy, L.A. TIMES, supra note 266, at 4.  
285. The Right to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1904, at 6. 
286. Letter to the Editor, The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1902, at
30.
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not as serious as she alleged.287 As one letter to the New 
York Times asked, why was it injurious to have one’s image
appropriated for advertising use “when the picture is a 
decent likeness of the individual and shows him or her to be
possessed of good qualities”?288 “Where is the harm done . . .
even if such picture is used for advertising purposes”?289 
Might the subjects of commercial publicity, one critic 
speculated, actually be pleased by it?290 
These comments, I suggest, evince the stirrings of a
nascent consumerist worldview. By 1910, the nation was on 
its way to becoming a full-fledged consumer society oriented
around material possessions and conspicuous consumption. 
Notions of personal identity and self-fulfillment were 
increasingly bound up in the acquisition and display of
goods. In this cultural environment, there was significantly
less moral aversion towards the advertising use of the
human persona. Commodifying one’s image was no longer
viewed as a “prostitution of the personality” but in some 
cases, as a legitimate source of pleasure, income, and social 
esteem. 
B.  The Transitional Era, 1905-1920  
Historians have regarded the period between 1905 and
1920 as a transitional era between the anti-consumerism of
the late nineteenth century and the modern mass consumer 
society.291 In this era, there was a “revolution in manners
and morals”292 among the middle and upper classes that led 
to the weakening of traditional values that had once 
“vigorously mediated between people and an expanding
287. J. Flynn, Letter to the Editor, The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
1902, at 8; see also Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443
(N.Y. 1902).
 288. Flynn, supra note 287, at 8.
 289. Id.
 290. Larremore, supra note 213, at 702 (“The average person likes to see his
picture in a newspaper upon any pretext.”). 
291. Stearns, supra note 107, at 113. 
292. FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE
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market economy,” in the words of historian William
Leach.293 The ethos that had advocated perpetual work,
saving, and self-denial was beginning to give way to a new
set of values advocating leisure, continuous spending, and 
visible consumption.294 
In unprecedented numbers, Americans shopped for 
standardized, ready-made goods that were distributed 
nationally.295 Luxury items such as fashionable clothing, 
home furnishings and brand-new products like bicycles 
came within the reach and desire of more buyers,296 and the 
variety and volume of goods increased significantly.297 The
department store became “the great palace of the new
consumer culture where an abundance of goods was proudly 
displayed and sold, and where shopping became an
emotional experience,” in the words of historian Simon
Bronner.298 People beheld the promise of consumer items in
advertisements, catalogues, magazine illustrations, and 
other texts in which products were alluringly displayed.299 
The nation’s wealth and abundance were beginning to be
recast not as agents of moral decadence but rather the fruits
of modernity and “civilization.”300 As economist Simon 
Patten summarized, “the new morality does not consist in
saving, but in expanding consumption.”301 
293. Leach, supra note 38, at 101.
294. As historian Susan Strasser writes, “In the culture emerging at the turn
of the twentieth century, a culture increasingly organized around the mass
production and marketing of consumer goods, new needs surfaced in tandem
with new products and with new ways of life that characterized urban industrial
society.” STRASSER, supra note 41, at 16-17. 
295. See, e.g., ORVELL, AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 56, at 17; 
STRASSER, supra note 41, at 17. 
296. See ORVELL, AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 56, at 42. 
297. HOROWITZ, supra note 103, at xxvi. 
298. Bronner, supra note 26, at 26. 
299. Stearns, supra note 107, at 110. 
300. See  SIMON N. PATTEN, THE NEW BASIS OF CIVILIZATION 215 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1968) (1921). 
301. Id.
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This embrace of consumption and material pleasures
was part of a broader “sensual revolution” in this era. As
advertising continuously exhorted people to indulge their
material yearnings, as women gained greater political and
sexual freedoms, and as strict Victorian attitudes towards
sexuality began to seem repressive, the open display of 
desire became less socially and morally problematic. With
enthusiasm and frequency, Americans began to participate 
not only in consumer behavior on a large scale, but also 
overtly sensual forms of public entertainment in such 
venues as dance halls, amusement parks, vaudeville
theater, and by 1910, motion picture theaters.302 
The social status of actors and actresses rose
significantly.303 In a culture that was becoming oriented 
around desire, materialism, and display, performers were
beginning to be seen as icons of fashion and lifestyle.304 The
increasing prestige of actors and actresses led advertisers to 
covet their photographs as a source of illustrations for
product advertisements.305 By the World War I era, 
advertisers were regularly negotiating contracts with 
performers for the use of their images.306 With changing 
attitudes towards consumerism and sexuality, earlier 
proscriptions against the use of women in advertising were 
fading away.307 The commodification of women’s bodies in 
such popular cultural venues as movies, vaudeville, and
302. See  PETER N. STEARNS, BATTLEGROUND OF DESIRE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
SELF-CONTROL IN MODERN AMERICA 121 (1999) (“In emphasizing indulgence and
appetite over restraint, consumerism shifted other priorities toward greater 
pleasure seeking. . . .[C]onsumerism and a more open interest in sex were joined
by 1900.”).
 303. MCARTHUR, supra note 96, at 123.  
304. As historian Marlis Schweitzer has written, “[a] series of interrelated
developments [in the early 1900s] facilitated the transformation of the actress
from outcast into role model,” including “the gradual professionalization of
acting . . . the promotional efforts of press agents . . . and, perhaps most
importantly, the emergence of a modern culture oriented towards display and
show.” Schweitzer, supra note 95, at 266.
 305. See, e.g., SIVULKA, supra note 45, at 74.
 306. See id.
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beauty pageants reflected the erosion of the Victorian idea 
that refined women did not display themselves in public.308 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, the use of
models in ads for products had become a craze,309 and a 
commercial modeling industry was developing.310 A 
photographer named Beatrice Tonnesen came up with an
idea for a “modeling agency,” and she made hundreds of
advertising pictures using live models which she sold to
advertisers.311 In the 1910s, a photographer named Hiller 
had amassed the photographs of 3000 models that he sold to
magazines and to companies such as Corning and General 
Electric.312 Newspaper articles began to describe modeling
as a respectable profession for young women.313 
These developments, and improvements in technology
that made photographic images easier and less expensive to
take and reproduce, led to the gradual decline of the
“circulating portrait” problem. Although there were still 
notorious instances in which photographic portraits of
ordinary people were published in ads without consent, the
use of random and irrelevant pictures to adorn ads was
becoming passé, in the words of a 1910 advertising trade 
journal.314 In a culture that was embracing sensuality and 
the pleasures of the material, the covert black market in
“circulating portraits” was becoming an open market in
advertising images, one that was prestigious and lucrative.
The prima facie association of commerce and 
308. See id. at 261-70.
 309. HENISCH, supra note 53, at 232-33. 
310. See BANNER, AMERICAN BEAUTY, supra note 60, at 262. 
311. See Scott Cross, Beatrice Tonnesen: First Commercial Photographer and 
Artist, BEATRICE  TONNESEN—PHOTOGRAPHER & ARTIST, http://www.beatrice 
tonnesen.com/bio/. 
312. Brown, supra note 58, at 51. “The models assembled for [his] studio
included artists’ models, working-class men and women seeking a little extra
cash . . . as well as a small group of middle-class women who modelled [sic] for 
the excitement and pleasure of being photographed with exceptional care in
their best clothes.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
313. BANNER, AMERICAN BEAUTY, supra note 60, at 261. 
314. See Schweitzer, supra note 95, at 264-65.
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commodification with indignity and disrepute had begun to 
fade. 
C.  Personal Images as Property  
A testament to this new order, in a number of early 
twentieth century “libel by advertising” cases, courts began 
to question whether the mere appearance of one’s image in
an ad was so stigmatic that it would lower one’s reputation.
In a case brought over the unauthorized use of a woman’s
photograph on the defendant’s trading stamps, the court
concluded that the woman’s appearance in a commercial 
context would not injure her social standing among her 
peers.315 The implication that she had willingly posed for the
trading stamps was not necessarily one that would “reflect[]
upon [her] character or reputation.”316 In another case where
a woman alleged that she was defamed by her mere 
appearance in an advertisement, the libel claim failed
because she could not obtain testimony from any members 
of the community who thought less of her for having been in 
an ad.317 
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis had argued for a tort
right to privacy, distinct from a right of property, because 
the idea of a woman’s face or body as a commodity that
could be bought and sold was reprehensible to the Victorian 
sensibility.318 Yet by 1920, many who argued that a person 
had a privacy right in his or her image did so on the 
grounds that one’s face or photograph was a form of
property.319 This blurring of privacy and property can be 
315. Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 104 N.Y.S. 1102, 1102-04 (App. Div.
1907).
 316. Id. at 1103-04. 
317. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 533 (Kan. 1918). 
318. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 214. 
319. Some argued that damages should have been awarded to Abigail
Roberson purely for pecuniary loss. See, e.g., Comment, An Actionable Right of
Privacy?, 12 YALE L.J. 37 (1902). As the Yale Law Review wrote, “[t]he use of
this young woman’s portrait for advertising in itself affirms that it had a more
or less definite value for that purpose. . . . [W]henever unusual beauty of face or
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attributed, in part, to the tendency of the early twentieth
century legal world to think in terms of property rights, and 
the then-existing rule that only interference with property 
rights, not personal rights, could be enjoined.320 But lawyers’
attempts to root privacy in property also suggests new 
cultural attitudes towards image commodification and the 
way that personal photographs were becoming valuable
objects in a robust and flourishing market for images. As
the Albany Law Journal wrote in an article on the Roberson
case, “[i]t is tolerably well known that popular actresses 
have posed for photographers, and divided with them the 
profits of property rights in their own forms and features.”321 
If a woman “has nothing in the nature of a property right in 
her own form and features, who has a better right?”322 In the 
1911 case Munden v. Harris, which had involved the
unauthorized use of a young boy’s photo in an ad for
jewelry, the plaintiff sought an injunction and damages for 
an invasion of his privacy.323 The court held that the 
publication could be enjoined and that the boy had a right to 
privacy because his image could be a source of profit and 
therefore was a form of property.324 As the court observed:  
One may have peculiarity of appearance, and if it is to be made a
matter of merchandise, why should it not be for his benefit? . . . If
there is value in it, sufficient to excite the cupidity of another, why 
is it not the property of him who gives it the value and from whom
the value springs?325 
By 1910, many courts that recognized a “privacy” claim
against “public portraiture”326 did so on the grounds “that
one has an exclusive right to his picture, on the score of its
commercial value of that portrait must vest in the original of the picture . . . .”
Id.
 320. See, e.g., Herbert Spencer Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 NW. L. REV. 1 
(1985).
 321. The Right of Privacy, 64 ALB. L.J. 248, 248 (1902).
 322. Id.
323. Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911). 
324. Id. at 1079.
 325. Id. at 1078.  
326. Post, supra note 16, at 649.
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being a property right of material profit.”327 Despite
acknowledging the property-like nature of one’s image,
courts nonetheless awarded damages for personal injury—
emotional and dignitary harms. As Robert Post has 
observed, the tort of appropriation “lurched precariously 
between formulations of privacy and property.”328 This 
confusion and ambivalence befits a culture in a state of
transition. 
Courts in this era continued to acknowledge that one’s 
unauthorized appearance in an advertisement could 
constitute an injury to one’s feelings and reputation and 
awarded damages on that basis.329 Yet at the same time, 
they were beginning to suggest that the human likeness 
was an object that could be profitably transacted on the
open market, particularly when actors, models, and other 
“professional” endorsers were involved, and implied that
such transactions were not necessarily illicit or 
illegitimate.330 The moral and social stigma that had 
surrounded commercial endorsement and the trafficking in
human images was beginning to disappear. But courts were
not yet ready to treat the image truly like a thing—to
commodify the persona and award damages for pecuniary 
loss caused by the unauthorized commercial exploitation of 
one’s image. The full legal commodification of the image 
would not take place until the second third of the twentieth
century, when consumer culture flourished and was truly 
integrated into the fabric of American life. 
IV. FROM DIGNITY TO PROFIT 
In the period between the two world wars, the
foundations of modern consumer society took root in the
United States.331 In the 1920s, industrial production almost 
327. Munden, 134 S.W. at 1079.
 328. Post, supra note 16, at 649.
 329. See, e.g., Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 532 (Kan. 1918).
 330. See discussion infra Part IV.
 331. THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 
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doubled;332 movies, radio, cars, magazines, “installment
buying, [and] the five day work week” became central
cultural institutions.333 Mass advertising, urban department
stores, and other commercial venues exhorted people to
fulfill their material desires.334 Once seen as an assault to
the moral foundations of the self and society, engagement
with the practices and values of mass consumption had
become a means of enhancing one’s self and social identity.  
A.  Modern American Consumer Culture  
As sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd noted in their 
classic study Middletown, by 1930 the culture of
consumption had swept middle-class America.335 In contrast 
to the average American in the nineteenth century, the
Lynds wrote, the modern residents of Middletown embraced 
upward mobility as one of their primary goals; they aspired
to achieve social respect and status through the acquisition
and display of prestigious cars, clothes, and other consumer
items.336 
Advertising continued to forge the link between
consumerism, emotional fulfillment, and social status. “In
an effort to . . . refute lingering charges of charlatanism,
advertising agents . . . began to reinvent themselves as
professional businessmen,” historian Marlis Schweitzer
observes.337 The industry’s new respectability contributed to
the credibility and persuasiveness of its messages.338 By
1920, agencies had developed for the purpose of creating 
advertisements for manufacturers,339 and “admen” were
332. SIVULKA, supra note 45, at 120.  
333. THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION, supra note 331, at 103.  
334. SIVULKA, supra note 45, at 82.  
335. See generally  ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A
STUDY IN MODERN AMERICAN CULTURE (1959). 
336. Id.
 337. Schweitzer, supra note 95, at 264.
 338. Id. 
339. See SIVULKA, supra note 45, at 98-99.
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regarded as white-collar professionals.340 Advertisers took
advantage of recent developments in mass communication—
the development of film and radio, and the increased 
circulation of newspapers and magazines—to disseminate
their pitches and slogans to a national audience. They also
relied on ever more persuasive appeals, including slick and 
professional illustrations, both drawn and photographed. In
1894, thirty percent of ads included pictures; by 1919 this
had risen to ninety percent.341 By 1900, annual expenditures 
on advertising stood at $95,000,000 a year.342 By 1919, it 
exceeded half a billion dollars, and by 1929 it reached over a
billion dollars.343 With words and pictures, advertisers
linked consumer items to such coveted internal states as
self-respect and freedom and promised personal fulfillment
through the purchase and use of commercial products.344 
The motion picture became the nation’s premiere form
of entertainment in the 1920s, and film actors rose to the
position of celebrities.345 Actors’ images commanded mass
public attention and, in their own right, became valuable
commodities.346 Though motion picture stars ostensibly 
“acted,” the real basis of their fame was their ability to 
publicize their images.347 No longer regarded as a view into
the intimate soul, the photograph was coming to be
regarded as merely an image, a surface representation 
distinct from the “real self” that could be infinitely
transformed and manipulated for personal gain.348 The key
340. See, e.g., FOX, supra note 123, at 78-117 (discussing the growth of the 
advertising world and its leaders). See also Bartholomew, Advertising, supra
note 122, at 19 (“Often viewed with disapproval in the 1800s, advertisers were
held in high regard throughout the first part of the twentieth century.”).
 341. OHMANN, supra note 44, at 176, 179-80.
 342. POTTER, supra note 35, at 169. 
343. Id.
 344. See generally ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE AMERICAN DREAM:
MAKING WAY FOR MODERNITY 1920-1940 (1985).
 345. See id. at 61.
 346. See id. at 61-64.
 347. See id.
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to celebrity stardom was to assemble fragments of cultural 
meaning into a cohesive image or “star persona” and to vend 
that image to the public.349 Sociological studies of the period 
indicated that many Americans emulated celebrities and 
their ability to glamorize and publicize their identities and 
images.350 They bought the items that stars endorsed; some
even dreamed of having their own pictures used in
advertisements.351 
Conspicuous consumption and celebrity became
mutually reinforcing phenomena. Actors gained status for 
their luxurious lifestyles, and consumption was legitimized 
as it became the preferred leisure activity of the stars.352 
Film celebrity had become an immense source of economic 
value, and advertisers regularly contracted with movie
actors for the use of their personae.353 By the 1930s, film
stars appeared in advertisements for a wide range of
consumer products, often commanding huge sums for their 
images and testimonials.354 The sign that a Hollywood actor
had become a star was her ability to generate income
through product endorsements.355 It was not just film actors 
who were paid to appear in ads. Americans had become 
349. See, e.g, RICHARD DYER, STARS (1979); JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED 
CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW (1991).
 350. See, e.g., HERBERT BLUMER, MOVIES AND CONDUCT (1933).
 351. Id.
352. One writer noted “that the consumption patterns of Hollywood had
become a standard of reference for popular consumption, making it possible for 
the housewife in Vermont or Oregon to explain to her hairdresser, her
dressmaker, or her decorator the ideal that she is trying to realize.” STUART 
EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLITICS OF STYLE IN CONTEMPORARY
CULTURE 89 (1988) (quoting MARGARET FARRAND THORP, AMERICA AT THE MOVIES
113 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Madow, supra note 44, 
at 163. 
353. GAINES, supra note 349, at 159 (“Beginning in the twenties, studios were
besieged with requests for star product endorsements . . . .”); see Charles Eckert, 
The Carole Lombard in the Macy’s Window, in MOVIES AND MASS CULTURE 95, 
116 (John Belton ed., 1996) (“The Hollywood studios, with their rosters of
contracted stars, had come to occupy a privileged position in the advertising
industry.”). 
354. Schweitzer, supra note 95, at 257; see also Madow, supra note 44, at 166. 
355. See, e.g., MARCHAND, supra note 344, at 61-64.
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fascinated with a pantheon of celebrities—sports stars,
stage performers, singers, artists, and socialites, among
others—who profitably licensed their images to advertisers 
and merchandisers.356 As the cultural studies scholar Jane
Gaines has observed, “experts and celebrities, whose
personal testimony and photographs appeared in 
advertisements,” began to be regarded like “aristocracy.”357 
The commercial model also rose to a position of cultural 
envy and esteem.358 The further development of modeling 
agencies in this era gave the profession legitimacy and 
helped transform the model from an “object of opprobrium”
to one of status.359 So coveted had modeling become as an 
occupation that the John Robert Powers modeling agency,
the largest modeling agency of the time, hired a number of 
New York socialites to model clothes both for fashion shows 
and advertisements.360 They found modeling glamorous and 
“in keeping with their own aspirations for social 
preferment.”361 The idea that a person might earn social and 
material success by commercially exploiting one’s image
marked a fundamental and decisive break with the past. 
The ability to vend one’s likeness meant that one had
acquired the looks and charm that were essential forms of 
cultural capital in an image-based consumer society. 
By the end of the third decade of the twentieth century, 
advertising, mass consumption, and the “world of goods”
were no longer imbued with overtones of misdeed and illicit
temptation.362 Individuals staked “a real portion of their 
356. “[T]he ‘publicity values’ of movie and sports stars could now be exploited
profitably in a wide range of collateral endeavors.” See Madow, supra note 44, at 
166.
 357. GAINES, supra note 349, at 159. 
358. BANNER, AMERICAN BEAUTY, supra note 60, at 261-63. 
359. Id. at 263; Brown, supra note 58, at 52-53.
 360. BANNER, AMERICAN BEAUTY, supra note 60, at 263. 
361. Id.
 362. LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE, supra note 115, at 139. Although, as Lears
notes, it is not fair to impute a consumer mindset to everyone: “ordinary 
Americans . . . preserve[d] vernacular ways of knowing, refusing to conform to
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personal identities and their quest for meaning—even their
emotional satisfaction—on the search for and acquisition of
goods,” in the words of historian Peter Stearns.363 In this
world of celebrity and conspicuous consumption, the 
pinnacle of social achievement, for many, was to acquire
goods and be publicly associated with consumer products.
Perhaps it was even to turn one’s image into a commodity to
be sold and displayed before the public. 
B.  The Modern Tort of Appropriation  
Consistent with this cultural turn, the post-1920
advertising appropriation cases took on a very different
focus and tone than those at the turn of the century. With 
the proliferation of advertising and consumer culture, there 
was a marked increase in the number of cases, particularly
those brought by celebrities.364 Plaintiffs, both celebrity and
noncelebrity, no longer spoke exclusively in terms of shame, 
opprobrium, and moral offense. In some cases, they never 
mentioned any indignity, embarrassment, or reputational 
harm caused by the commodification of their images. The
cry was no longer exclusively, as it had once been, to avoid
being made a part of commerce against one’s will. Rather, in 
many instances, it was to protect one’s ability to publicize
oneself and to extract maximum value from the commercial 
use of one’s image and identity. 
Libel by advertising cases became increasingly
infrequent.365 The claim that one’s reputation had been
ruined by the mere fact of his appearance in an 
advertisement was largely untenable in the new consumer 
environment.366 In 1936, a woman brought suit for libel over 
the unauthorized use of her photograph in an advertisement
ethnic, and occupational traditions survived and nurtured alternative modes of
conduct and consciousness.” Id.
363. Stearns, supra note 107, at 105.  
364. See George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as
Property, 51 LA. L. REV. 443, 459 (1991); Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, 
supra note 14, at 230.
 365. See, e.g., Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55 (N.C. 1938). 
366. Id. at 59.
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for Melt’s Rye and Whole Wheat Bread.367 The court 
concluded that it was no shame to be a commercial endorser 
of bread; “[t]o recommend . . . an item of daily food is not 
likely to subject one to ridicule or contempt.”368 In the 1941
case O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., a football player brought
suit over an advertisement that used a picture of him to sell
beer.369 He claimed to have been “greatly embarrassed and 
humiliated.”370 The court denied him a cause of action,
noting that “the business of making and selling beer is a
legitimate and eminently respectable business” and that the
use of his picture in a beer ad “could not possibly disgrace . . 
. or cause him damage.”371 
Rather than initiate libel claims, the subjects of
unauthorized advertising exploitation were more likely to
sue either under the New York “privacy” statute, or the
common law privacy tort. By the 1930s, the common law 
right to privacy had been recognized in several states.372 
While many courts rejected or severely limited a right to
privacy that would impose liability for the publication of 
“news” and other truthful information, the majority of 
states that recognized a right to privacy did so in the
commercial appropriation context.373 “In every state which
recognizes the right of privacy, the name or photograph of a 
living person may not be used without his permission for 
purposes of advertising or trade,” lawyer Louis Nizer 
summarized in 1941.374 “Indeed, in some jurisdictions, this is
said to be the sole criterion . . . .”375 
Although advertisers and retailers apparently did use
purloined photos of private individuals on occasion, the 
367. Id. at 57-58.
 368. Id. at 62.
369. O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1941).
 370. Id. at 169.
 371. Id. at 169-70. 
372. See, e.g., Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century’s
Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 553-54 (1941).
 373. See, e.g., id.






























2013] FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 1179
typical appropriation case no longer involved “circulating
portraits.” More often, claims were raised by models, actors, 
sports figures, and other celebrities whose images had been
used in various product endorsements without consent or 
payment. Although emotional distress and reputational 
harm were sometimes alleged, the nature of the harm in
many cases was quite patently pecuniary.376 In Miller v.
Madison Square Garden Corp., a well-known performer
brought a privacy action seeking damages for the 
unauthorized use of his name and photograph in a program
sold to patrons in connection with a bicycle race.377 The
plaintiff admitted “that the use of his name and picture by
[the] defendant had not subjected him to any ridicule nor 
caused him any humiliation whatever.”378 In 1921, an
actress sued under the New York “privacy” statute over the
unauthorized use of her image in a magazine 
advertisement.379 No dignitary harm was alleged.380 She 
simply wanted to be paid for the use of her image.381 
Even noncelebrity plaintiffs were no longer seeing their
injuries exclusively in terms of embarrassment or loss of
dignity.382 In the 1920s, an 18-year-old woman recognized 
her image on an advertising poster for a flour product.383 
She brought a lawsuit seeking $50,000 for the use of her 
image.384 A woman from Brooklyn, according to the New
York Times, was asking for $25,000 for the rights to her 
picture.385 In the words of legal scholar George Armstrong,
“[y]oung ladies who might have ‘taken to bed’ in humiliation 
376. Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 28 N.Y.S. 2d. 811, 812 (Sup. Ct.
1941).
 377. Id.
 378. Id. at 813.
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. . . at the sight of their face on a flour ad were now avidly 
negotiating these commercial transactions.”386 
This is not to say that people were never genuinely
embarrassed or distressed by the use of their pictures to sell
products that they had not actually endorsed, or that they 
were unfailingly enthusiastic about the prospect of 
commercial publicity. Even celebrities made plausible 
claims of emotional distress caused by the unauthorized
advertising use of their images. Actresses worked hard to
control the messages associated with their names and 
images. They were “notoriously fussy about their
photographs” and could react strongly when they were
publicly depicted in a way that clashed with the image they 
wanted to convey.387 In a 1938 case, a singer brought an 
action for invasion of privacy on the ground that the 
defendant had, without her permission, placed a photo of
her in an advertisement on the front of a burlesque
theater.388 She considered herself a respectable, legitimate 
actress and alleged that the implication that she was a mere 
“showgirl” assaulted her dignity and reputation.389 
Yet the courts often found it uncompelling when a star, 
who made her living from mass exposure, complained that 
her feelings had been assaulted by unwanted publicity.390 In 
many privacy cases in which a celebrity alleged dignitary or
emotional harms, courts dismissed such allegations out of 
hand.391 According to courts, celebrities had developed a
386. Id.
 387. See Schweitzer, supra note 95, at 274.
In 1916, “America’s sweetheart” Mary Pickford received a reported 4,000
requests for permission to publish her photograph for advertising
purposes before she finally agreed to allow the Pompeian Manufacturing
Company . . . to use her image. Seventy poses were made before she was
satisfied with the results and willing to release one photograph to the
company.
Id. at 275 n.63. 
388. See Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 57-58 (N.C. 1938).  
389. See id.
 390. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1941);
Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338, 340 (1938).



















   
 
  








   
2013] FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 1181
thick skin when it came to publicity and could not claim to 
be wounded by the unauthorized use of their pictures, even 
in a commercial context unfavorable to them.392 One who
made a livelihood out of commodifying herself could not
claim to be offended when her image was commodified by 
someone else.393 In formal legal terms, celebrities had
“waived” their right to avoid all unwanted publicity,
including unwanted commercial exploitation.394 As the court
concluded in Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co.: 
This court is of the opinion that any person following the
theatrical business for a life’s work has no such right of privacy . .
. . Her embarkation on this vocation in life has estopped her from 
a right to be heard to complain that her personal right of privacy
has been invaded.395 
Courts also recognized, in cases involving both celebrities
and noncelebrities, that in many instances pecuniary 
injuries were the real motive for bringing suit. As a North 
Carolina appeals court noted in 1938, “[o]ne of the accepted 
and popular methods of advertising in the present day is to 
procure and publish the indorsement [sic] of the article
being advertised by some well-known person . . . . If the
name of a person is a valuable asset in connection with an
advertising enterprise, then . . . his face or features are
likewise of value.”396 In 1939, a New York state court
acknowledged that the state’s “privacy” statute was
intended “to stop the merchandising in the channels of 
normal trade of a portrait of a person who occupies a
position in which there is monetary value [in] publicizing
 392. See Madow, supra note 44, at 168-69.
 393. See id.
394. See Nimmer, supra note 21, at 204. Melville Nimmer wrote:
Situations may of course occur where exploitation of a plaintiff’s
publicity values will prove humiliating or embarrassing to him, but in
most situations one who has achieved such prominence as to give a
publicity value to the use of his name, photograph, and likeness cannot
honestly claim that he is humiliated or offended by their use before the
public.
Id. at 207.  
395. Martin, 10 Ohio Op. at 340.
396. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 64 (N.C. 1938).
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[one’s portrait].”397 Torts scholars similarly began to reject 
the conceptualization of appropriation as a privacy or
dignity based harm.398 Leon Green noted in 1932 that “[t]he 
classification of [appropriation] cases as ‘privacy’ cases does 
not hit the mark.”399 
Yet as a matter of formal doctrine, damages for
“invasion of privacy” could not be recovered for pecuniary 
losses, only emotional and dignitary harms. The effect was 
to leave many subjects of advertising appropriation,
particularly celebrity plaintiffs, without compensation for 
the economic losses they suffered.400 In Fisher v. Rosenberg,
the plaintiff was a professional dancer who, while dancing
with the famous dancer Irene Castle, had photos taken in
two dancing poses.401 The defendant used these pictures in
newspaper advertisements of the defendant’s shoes.402 The
plaintiff sued under the New York privacy statute,
ostensibly seeking to recover what he might have been paid 
had he licensed his image to the shoe company.403 The court
awarded only nominal damages, noting that there was no 
harm to the plaintiff’s dignity, as publicity usually inured to 
the benefit of entertainment stars.404 
By the 1940s, the law was caught between an earlier
worldview that had viewed the unauthorized commercial 
exploitation of the persona as a moral wrong and the
realities of a modern, consumption-driven celebrity culture. 
The tort of invasion of privacy had been conceptualized as a
remedy for the injuries to personal dignity caused by the
unauthorized appearance of one’s image in an
advertisement. Yet emotional and dignitary harms were 
becoming, in many cases, peripheral to appropriation 
actions. Courts in the interwar period recognized the
397. Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 674, 682 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
 398. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932).
 399. Id. at 246.
 400. See discussion infra Part IV.C.  
401. Fisher v. Rosenberg, Inc., 23 N.Y.S.2d 677, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940).  
402. Id.
 403. Id.
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property-like nature of personal images and that models 
and celebrities regularly licensed their names, images, and 
identities to advertisers and manufacturers. They also 
acknowledged that the late nineteenth century culture of
anti-materialism was no longer the backdrop against which
appropriation claims were brought. After World War II, 
courts finally began to reject the idea of commercial 
appropriation of identity as a dignitary harm and reoriented
the tort from a right of privacy to a right of “publicity.” 
C.  The Right of Publicity  
In the 1950s—the celebrated era of postwar affluence 
and mass consumption—courts began to formally recognize
a “right of publicity,” a purely “pecuniary interest in the
commercial exploitation of [] identity,” distinct from a right 
of privacy.405 In the 1953 case Haelan Labs. Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., a case involving a baseball card 
manufacturer that had used the likeness of a famous 
baseball player without his consent,406 a federal appeals
court recognized what the lawyer Melville Nimmer 
famously described as “the right of each person to control
and profit from the publicity values which he has created or 
purchased.”407 As the court concluded: 
It is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially
actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised 
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in 
newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.408 
The court made explicit what had been apparent for several 
decades—that the act of commercializing one’s persona
405. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d. 831, 834 (6th
Cir. 1983).
 406. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867-68
(2d Cir. 1953).
 407. Nimmer, supra note 21, at 218.
 408. Haelan Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d at 868.
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existed in an entirely different social and moral register
than at the time of the right to privacy’s invention.409 
Under this new “right of publicity,” damages would be
“computed in terms of the value of the publicity
appropriated by defendant rather than . . . in terms of the
injury sustained by the plaintiff,” in the words of Nimmer, 
who praised the Haelan decision in an influential law
review article in 1954 and advocated the further 
development and adoption of a “right of publicity.”410 As 
Nimmer wrote, privacy doctrine, “first developed to protect
the sensibilities of nineteenth century Brahmin Boston, is
not adequate to meet the demands of the second half of the
twentieth century, particularly with respect to . . . [w]ell
known personalities.”411 Celebrities “do not seek the ‘solitude
and privacy’ which Brandeis and Warren sought to protect. 
Indeed, privacy is the one thing they do ‘not want, or 
need.’”412 Under the Haelan/Nimmer formulation, the
invasion of one’s right of publicity would be “actionable
regardless of whether the defendant used the publicity in a 
manner offensive to the sensibilities of the plaintiff.”413 
There would be no “waiver” of the right by virtue of the 
plaintiff’s celebrity.  
Nimmer’s article both acknowledged and contributed to
an important shift in the law. A decade later, some states 
had adopted a “right of publicity” as a property-based 
interest.414 The right of publicity protected the “pecuniary 
interest in identity,”415 with “identity” broadly defined as
representations of one’s “persona,” including one’s name,
voice, and likeness.416 Some states redesignated
appropriation as a “proprietary [tort],” a personal right that
409. See id.
 410. Nimmer, supra note 21, at 216, 218. 
411. Id. at 203.
 412. Id. at 203-04. 
413. Id. at 216.
 414. Bartholomew, A Right is Born, supra note 23, at 313.
415. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.
1983). 
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was based on a property interest—the measure of damages 
was lost profits—but that did not encompass the full
“bundle of property rights” associated with legal ownership 
of property.417 In his famous 1960 law review article Privacy,
the noted torts scholar William Prosser asserted, based on a
survey of existing case law, that the appropriation tort
protected a proprietary interest “in the exclusive use of the
plaintiff’s name and likeness as an aspect of his identity.”418 
The Second Restatement of Torts designated the tort of
appropriation as protecting a “property right.”419 
In some states, the new appropriation tort merged
dignity and property interests—recovery was to be based
“both on an individual’s right of privacy and on his economic 
interest in his personality.”420 In a 1953 case, Eick v. Perk
Dog Food, involving the unauthorized use of the picture of a 
woman in an ad for dog food, the court held that she could 
recover both for “mental distress as well as the actual 
pecuniary damages which the appropriation causes.”421 The 
New York privacy statute was interpreted to permit
damages both for mental anguish and for invasion of one’s
property interest in one’s persona.422 
Some states that adopted the right of publicity formally
retained appropriation as a separate dignity or privacy 
based tort, but sharply limited the possibility of recovery for 
emotional distress or dignitary and reputational harm.423 
Courts often rejected such claims on the theory that the
only emotional distress that could follow from the 
unauthorized commercial use of one’s image would be the
distress at having lost the opportunity to make a profit.424 
417. Id. at 312-14.
 418. Prosser, supra note 13, at 406. 
419. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977). 
420. James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and
Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 652 (1973).
421. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952).
 422. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867-68
(2d Cir. 1953).
 423. Treece, supra note 420, at 641.
 424. Id. at 640-41. Treece states:
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As one legal commentator observed, “[t]he nature of the 
injury to self-esteem caused by advertising is elusive. . . . So
far no scientist has offered evidence that people generally
experience displeasure, anger, shock, or hatred when their
name or picture appears in an advertisement without their 
consent.”425 
As the mass media proliferated in the latter twentieth
century, and as the commodification of personal image
continued to be a source of status and profit, both celebrities
and noncelebrities became increasingly protective of the
income-generating potential of their images and 
encountered a legal regime that was friendly to such
interests. Movie stars and other celebrities regularly
recovered damages for economic injuries caused by the
unauthorized use of their images in advertising and other 
commercial venues. The “right of publicity” or
appropriation-publicity tort was not limited only to those 
who were famous; anyone could obtain damages as long as 
they could show that their images had commercial value. In
Canessa v. Kislak, a New Jersey case from 1967, a veteran
whose picture had been used in an ad without his 
authorization sued to recover what he potentially might 
In reality the injury to sensibilities concept does not normally
meaningfully apply when a person routinely permits advertising uses of
his name and picture. Any anger or outrage that he might feel hardly 
flows from the shock of confronting his likeness in an advertisement.
Rather, his injury takes the form of diminished income. The harm
resides not in the use of his likeness but in the user’s failure to pay.
Id. But see Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 439 n.11 (Cal. 1979). The
dissenting opinion observed the possible types of indignity and mental distress
that might flow from the unpermitted commercial use of a person’s identity:
Commercial misappropriations may injure a person’s feelings in several
ways. First, the person may find any commercial exploitation
undesirable and offensive. Second, while certain commercial uses may 
be acceptable or even desirable, a particular use may be distressing.
Third, other individuals, unaware that the use is unauthorized, may
disparage one who would sell their identity for that purpose, thereby
inducing embarrassment, anger or mental distress.
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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have earned had he licensed his image for advertising use.426 
The court concluded that he had a cause of action to recover 
lost profits: “plaintiffs’ names and likenesses belong to
them. As such they are property. They are things of
value.”427 Without shame or moral hesitation, men and 
women of all backgrounds and stations in life sought to 
extract profit from their images, and such pleas were not
seen as immoral or illicit. 
CONCLUSION: THE ECLIPSE OF DIGNITY  
We should stand back and take notice at how far the 
law traveled since its origins in the crisis of the “circulating
portrait.” The appropriation-publicity tort is now oriented 
largely around economic interests, especially, though not
exclusively, the interests of those who make a profession out
of commodifying their images. Emotional, reputational, or
dignitary harms are rarely, if at all, the basis of recovery. 
The situation is the reverse of that which gave rise to the
“right to privacy.” The appropriation tort, or “right of
publicity,” now largely protects the pocketbooks of those 
who seek to exploit their own images, not the distress of 
someone who had no interest in and was deeply offended by 
being dragged into the world of commerce. 
Sounding more like late nineteenth century moralists
than twentieth century champions of consumption, a few
contemporary legal scholars have mourned the demise of
the dignitary tort. Indeed, although we live in a world 
“thoroughly dominated by market forces and saturated by a
culture of consumption,”428 writes Jonathan Kahn, people
may well feel legitimate distress at having their images
made to serve “the economic needs and interests of
others.”429 In the words of the eminent First Amendment
426. Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d. 62, 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1967).
 427. Id.
 428. Jonathan Kahn, Enslaving the Image: The Origins of the Tort of
Appropriation of Identity Reconsidered, 2 LEGAL THEORY 301, 306 (1996)
[hereinafter Kahn, Enslaving the Image]. 
429. Bloustein, supra note 149, at 988; see Kahn, Enslaving the Image, supra
note 425, at 306. 
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scholar Edward Bloustein, “[i]n a community at all sensitive 
to human values, it is degrading to . . . make a man part of
commerce against his will.”430 A person who sought to
exploit her identity in one context might well have a 
legitimate moral aversion to commercial publicity in
another, regardless of whether or not she was paid for it. 
There was an offense to the sensibilities of the person—an
affront to one’s sense of autonomy and right to self-
definition—regardless of any commercial advantage.431 
Kahn laments that courts have come to regard these 
concerns with dignity, honor, and personal sensibility as
outmoded if not antiquated.432 
430. Bloustein, supra note 149, at 988.
431. In 1967, Hyman Gross criticized Prosser’s characterization of the tort as
merely infringing upon a proprietary right of the plaintiff. Hyman Gross, The 
Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 50 (1967). Gross stated: “this is a
serious mislocation of the gravamen of the wrong. The offense is to sensibility,
and more particularly, to those sensibilities of a person which are offended by
another’s use of his personality regardless of any advantage.” Id.; see also 
McKenna, supra note 16, at 229 (“An individual’s choices . . . can be viewed as 
the text of her identity, and unauthorized uses of a person’s identity in
connection with products or services threaten to recreate that text and affect the 
way the individual is perceived by others.”). Insofar as the individual bears the
emotional cost of such perceptions, she has a dignitary or “privacy” interest in 
preventing commercial uses of her identity. See id.; see also Alisa M. Weisman,
Publicity as an Aspect of Privacy and Personal Autonomy, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 727,
730 (1982).
 432. See Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, supra note 14, at 264-66.
When courts have compensated emotional distress caused by commercial
exploitation of identity, they have tended to do so on the grounds of the false
attribution aspect of the misappropriation—the plaintiff was associated with a
truly embarrassing product. See, e.g., Clark v. Celeb Publ’g, Inc., 530 F. Supp.
979, 981-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Few if any recent cases seem to have been won
when the alleged injury was the indignity caused by the commercialization
itself. In one notable gesture to the anti-commodification ethos, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that singer Tom Waits could recover damages for
emotional harms caused by the commercial appropriation of identity when the
makers of Doritos used a sound-alike of his voice—which under California
appropriation law was considered an aspect of his “persona”—in a broadcast
advertisement. Waits had refused to commercially exploit his voice as a matter
of personal integrity. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096-1103 (9th
Cir. 1992). The court noted that although the injury stemming from violation of
Waits’ “right of publicity” ‘“may be largely, or even wholly, of an economic or
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As a practical matter, there is probably no going back to
the turn-of-the-century, exclusively dignitary model. The 
social commitments that supported it no longer exist. The 
“eclipse” of the dignity-based appropriation tort by the
profit-oriented appropriation tort or “right of publicity” was
a reflection of, and reaction to, fundamental moral and 
social transformations that took place in the first half of the
twentieth century. By the 1950s if not earlier, America had
gone from a culture that was deeply skeptical if not hostile
to the idea of commercializing the persona to one in which
such activities were sources of not only economic but also 
cultural capital. The reorientation of the appropriation
action tracked a major shift in popular perspectives on
advertising, the consumer marketplace, and the morality of
consumption. It attests to the triumph of consumer values 
and the commodification of the self and social identity in
our modern mass consumer society.  
a celebrity may induce humiliation, embarrassment, and mental distress.’” Id.
at 1103 (internal citation omitted). 

